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Abstract. Let G = (A∪B,E) be an instance of the stable marriage problem where every vertex ranks
its neighbors in a strict order of preference. A matching M in G is popular if M does not lose a head-
to-head election against any matching. Popular matchings are a well-studied generalization of stable
matchings, introduced with the goal of enlarging the set of admissible solutions, while maintaining a
certain level of fairness. Every stable matching is a min-size popular matching. Unfortunately, when
there are edge costs, it is NP-hard to find a popular matching of minimum cost – even worse, the
min-cost popular matching problem is hard to approximate up to any factor.
Let opt be the cost of a min-cost popular matching. Our goal is to efficiently compute a matching of
cost at most opt by paying the price of mildly relaxing popularity. Our main positive results are two
bi-criteria algorithms that find in polynomial time a near-popular or “quasi-popular” matching of cost
at most opt. Moreover, one of the algorithms finds a quasi-popular matching of cost at most that of
a min-cost popular fractional matching – this cost could be much smaller than opt. Key to the other
algorithm are a number of results for certain polytopes related to matchings. In particular, we give
a polynomial-size extended formulation for an integral polytope sandwiched between the popular and
quasi-popular matching polytopes. We complement these results by showing that it is NP-hard to find
a quasi-popular matching of minimum cost, and that both the popular and quasi-popular matching
polytopes have near-exponential extension complexity.
1 Introduction
Consider a bipartite graph G = (A∪B,E) on n vertices and m edges where every vertex ranks its neighbors
in a strict order of preference. Such an instance, commonly referred to as a marriage instance, is a classical
model in two-sided matching markets. A matching M is stable if there is no blocking pair with respect to
M : a pair (a, b) blocks M if both a and b prefer each other to their respective assignments in M . The notion
of stability was introduced by Gale and Shapley [15] in 1962 who showed that stable matchings always exist
in G and can be efficiently computed.
A broad class of objectives can be captured by defining a function cost : E → R and asking for a stable
matching whose sum of edge costs is minimized. Thus the min-cost stable matching problem includes several
stable matching problems such as finding one with max-utility or with min-regret, or one with given forced
and forbidden edges. More generally, a cost function allows a decision-maker to “access” the whole family of
stable matchings (possibly of exponential size), while the Gale-Shapley algorithm will always return the same
stable matching (i.e., the one that is optimal for one side of the bipartition). There are several polynomial time
algorithms to compute a min-cost stable matching and special variants of this problem [13,14,28,39,44,46].
Stable matchings and their extensions are used in many optimization problems in computer science,
economics, and operations research: these include matching students to schools/colleges [2,45] and medical
interns to hospitals [5,37]. Stability is a quite strict condition. For instance, all stable matchings have the
same size [16] which may be only half the size of a max-size matching in G—while matching students to
schools/colleges or medical interns to hospitals, one seeks larger matchings. On the other hand, one does
not want to simply ignore vertex preferences and impose a max-size matching in the given instance as such
a matching may be highly unstable wrt choices expressed by the vertices. Thus, what we seek is a weaker
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notion of stability that captures “overall stability” (rather than forbid blocking edges) and achieves more
social good, i.e., a better value (than the best stable matching) with respect to the given cost function.
Popularity. A natural relaxation of stability is popularity. Motivated by problems in cognitive science [17], it
has been extensively studied in the computer science community: we refer to [9] for a survey of contributions
and applications. Consider an election between two matchings M and N : here each vertex casts a vote for
the matching in {M,N} where it gets assigned a more preferred partner (being left unmatched is its least
preferred state) and it abstains from voting if its assignment is the same in M and N . Let φ(M,N) (resp.,
φ(N,M)) be the number of votes for M (resp., N) in this election. We say N is more popular than M if
φ(N,M) > φ(M,N).
Definition 1. A matching M is popular if there is no matching in G that is more popular than M , i.e.,
φ(M,N) ≥ φ(N,M) for all matchings N in G.
Thus a popular matching never loses a head-to-head election against any matching. In other words, it is
a weak Condorcet winner [6,36] in the voting instance where matchings are the candidates and vertices are
voters. Observe that no election can force a migration from a popular matching to some other matching.
Consider G = (A∪B,E) where A = {a1, a2}, B = {b1, b2}, and E = {(a1, b1), (a1, b2), (a2, b1)}. Suppose
a1 prefers b1 to b2 and similarly, b1 prefers a1 to a2. This instance admits only one stable matching {(a1, b1)};
the max-size matching {(a1, b2), (a2, b1)} is not stable but it is popular.
The notion of popularity was introduced by Gärdenfors [17] in 1975 who showed that every stable match-
ing is popular; in fact, every stable matching is a min-size popular matching [25]. Thus, we can obtain larger
matchings (as in the example above) by relaxing stability to popularity. There are efficient algorithms to
compute a max-size popular matching [25,29] in G and the size of a max-size popular matching is at least
2|Mmax|/3, where Mmax is a max-size matching in G.
Though computing a min-size/max-size popular matching is easy, it is NP-hard to decide if G admits a
popular matching that is neither a min-size nor a max-size popular matching [12]. It was also shown in [12]
that it is NP-hard to compute a min-cost popular matching in G = (A ∪ B,E); moreover, this problem is
NP-hard to approximate to any factor c even in the restricted case when every edge has cost 0 or 1.
Relaxing popularity. Though popularity is a natural notion of global stability and a min-cost popular
matching is more optimal (wrt its cost) than a min-cost stable matching, the fact that it is NP-hard to
approximate to any factor a min-cost popular matching represents a computational barrier. For the sake of
regaining the computational tractability lost when relaxing stability to popularity, it makes sense to also
relax popularity and replace it with near-popularity. This poses the following question: how to define a
matching that is “close” to being popular? Luckily, the literature has already provided a suitable concept:
the unpopularity factor of a matching, introduced in [35] and studied e.g. in [26,31,29,41]. Given a matching
M , its unpopularity factor is:
u(M) = max
N∈MG
N 6=M
φ(N,M)
φ(M,N)
,
whereMG is the set of matchings in G. Thus in an election between M and any other matching, the ratio
|{vertices against M}|/|{vertices for M}| is bounded from above by u(M). Note that u(M) ∈ Q≥0 ∪ {∞}.
Thus, the function unpopularity factor onMG, when it is not∞, captures the gamut of different matchings
M in G that are Pareto-optimal. A matching M is Pareto-optimal if there is no matching (other than M)
where every vertex is matched to a partner at least as good as in M . In fact, a matching M is popular iff
u(M) ≤ 1, while a matching M is Pareto-optimal iff u(M) <∞.
Interestingly, all known algorithms [4,26,29] for computing (unpopular) matchings with bounded unpop-
ularity factor bound u(M), where M is the matching computed, by some value that is 2 or more3 (see
Section 1.2). Thus, matchings with unpopularity factor at most 2 can be regarded as being close to popular.
3 The symmetric difference M ⊕N of 2 matchings M and N may have short alternating paths wrt M which force
u(M) ≥ 2. Forbidding such paths for an unpopular matching M is necessary to ensure u(M) < 2.
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Observe that no matching wins more than 1/2-fraction of the votes cast in its head-to-head election
against a popular matching. Similarly, no matching wins more than 2/3-fraction of the votes cast in its
head-to-head election against a matching with unpopularity factor at most 2.
Definition 1 A matching M in G = (A ∪B,E) is quasi-popular if u(M) ≤ 2.
Summarizing, for the sake of efficiency in computation, when comparing two matchings, we are ready to
relax never losing (the definition of popular matchings) to losing within a factor bounded by 2 (the definition
of quasi-popularity). Note that if we scale the votes in favor of M by 2, then a quasi-popular matching M
never loses an election. We show that relaxing popularity to quasi-popularity allows us to design efficient
algorithms for finding good matchings in G.
1.1 Our results and techniques
Given the discussion above, our objective would be to show an efficient algorithm for the min-cost quasi-
popular matching problem. Unfortunately, as we show here, this problem is as hard as the starting problem
– i.e., computing a min-cost popular matching.
Theorem 1. Given a marriage instance G = (A ∪ B,E) with a function cost : E → {0, 1}, it is NP-hard
to compute a min-cost quasi-popular matching in G. Moreover, it is NP-hard to approximate its cost within
any multiplicative factor.
Thus finding or approximating a min-cost popular or quasi-popular matching is hard. Our next attempt
is to overcome this hardness by considering the following intriguing question: can we find a quasi-popular
matching of cost at most that of a min-cost popular matching? Surprisingly (in the midst of all these hard
problems), this problem is tractable and this is our main result.
Theorem 2. Given a marriage instance G = (A∪B,E) with a function cost : E → R, there is a polynomial
time algorithm to compute a quasi-popular matching M such that cost(M) ≤ opt, where opt is the cost of a
min-cost popular matching in G.
We give two proofs of Theorem 2, based on two different algorithms. The first approach is as follows.
LetM1 (respectively,M2) be the set of popular (resp., quasi-popular) matchings in G. We will show a set
M∗ such that (1) M1 ⊆ M∗ ⊆ M2 and (2) conv(M∗) admits a formulation of size O(m + n) in Rm+n,
where conv(M∗) is the convex hull of characteristic vectors of matchings inM∗. Linear programming over
this formulation yields Theorem 2.
This result is proved in Section 4, where we show that conv(M∗) is a linear projection of one of the faces
F of a new extension4 of the dominant matching polytope of a supergraph G∗ of G.
Definition 2 A popular matching M in G = (A∪B,E) is dominant if M is more popular than every larger
matching, i.e., φ(M,M ′) > φ(M ′,M) for every larger matching M ′.
Every dominant matching is a max-size popular matching (by Definition 2). Dominant matchings always
exist in a marriage instance G [25]. Dominant matchings coincide with the linear image of stable matchings
in a related bipartite graph G′ on n vertices and 2m edges [11,12]. Hence an extension of the dominant
matching polytope DG in R2m (as the linear image of the stable matching polytope of G′) was known.
We obtain the above polytope F as a face of a new extension of DG of size O(m + n) in Rm+n (see
Theorem 10 and Theorem 11). The main tool for proving the integrality of this new extension is a compact
4 Using the terminology from polyhedral combinatorics, we say that a polytope Q that linearly projects to a polytope
P is an extension of P , and that a formulation for Q is an extended formulation for P .
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extended formulation of the popular matching polytope in a marriage instance where every stable matching
is perfect [27].
The second algorithm shows actually a result stronger than Theorem 2: we show that we can obtain in
polynomial time a quasi-popular matching of cost at most that of a min-cost popular fractional matching.
The set of all popular fractional matchings includes all popular matchings. We defer the definition of popular
fractional matchings and a description of their polytope to Section 6.
Polyhedral results. It is a natural question whether the positive/negative results on popular and quasi-
popular matchings are mirrored by the sizes of the descriptions of the associated polytopes. Let P =
conv(M1) (respectively, Q = conv(M2)) be the popular (resp., quasi-popular) matching polytope of G,
where M1 and M2 are defined above (just below Theorem 2). We prove that both P and Q have near-
exponential extension complexity (see Section 3.2 for definitions). This naturally follows from our hardness
result (as well as those in [10]) and known lower bounds in polyhedral combinatorics. In particular, we show
that a certain face of P (resp., Q) is an extension of certain independent set polytopes for which a lower
bound on the extension complexity is known [20].
Theorem 3. The extension complexity of the polytope P (also, of the polytope Q) is 2Ω( mlogm ).
The proof of Theorem 2 shows that conv(M∗) is an “easy-to-describe” integral polytope sandwiched
between two hard ones. As conv(M∗) has a formulation of size O(n +m), it is, in a way, a polytope with
“smallest extension complexity” sandwiched between P and Q.
Unlike the popular matching polytope, the dominant matching polytope DG admits a compact extended
formulation. However, unlike stable matchings whose polytope in Rm has a linear number of facets [46,39],
we show that DG does not admit a polynomial-size description in Rm. In fact, a complete linear description
of DG in the original space was not known so far. We give one here, and show that DG has an exponential
number of facets (in the size of the graph). Recall thatMG is the set of matchings in G = (A ∪ B,E) and
|E| = m.
Theorem 4. The dominant matching polytope DG admits a formulation of size O(|MG|) in Rm. Moreover,
there exists a constant c > 1 such that DG has Ω(cm) facets.
Our results on the dominant matching polytope are proved in Section 5.
Optimal Quasi-popular Matchings. In order to prove Theorem 1, we first prove structural results on
quasi-popular matchings. Stable matchings (by definition) and popular matchings (see [25]) have simple for-
bidden structures in terms of blocking edges—to come up with such forbidden structures for quasi-popular
matchings seems much more complex. Hence, we do not pursue this combinatorial approach. Instead, we
extend the LP-method used for popular fractional matchings [27,31,30] to design an appropriate dual certifi-
cate or witness (a vector in Rn: see Section 2 for details) for quasi-popularity, and deduce Theorem 1 (proved
in Section 3) from this.
We remark that all our results – both positive and negative – hold for bipartite graphs. Our proof
techniques borrow and extend tools from various approaches to popular matchings from the literature.
1.2 Background and related results
Algorithmic questions for popular matchings were first studied in the one-sided preferences model, where it
is only vertices in A that have preferences over their neighbors and cast votes (vertices in B are objects).
Popular matchings need not exist here and an efficient algorithm was given in [1] to determine if an instance
admits a popular matching or not. McCutchen [35] introduced the measure of unpopularity factor and showed
that computing a matching with least unpopularity factor in the one-sided preferences model is NP-hard.
Interestingly, in the one-sided preferences model, u(M) ≥ 2 for any unpopular matching M [35].
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When vertices on both sides have strict preferences, i.e., in a marriage instance, stable matchings always
exist and hence popular matchings always exist. As mentioned earlier, efficient algorithms are known to com-
pute max-size popular matchings [25,29]. These matchings compute dominant matchings (see Definition 2).
A linear time algorithm was given in [11] to decide if G has a popular matching with a given edge e: it
was shown that it was enough to check if there was either a stable matching or a dominant matching with
the edge e. A compact extended formulation of the popular fractional matching polytope in the one-sided
preferences model was given in [31], where it was shown that popular mixed matchings always exist and can
be computed in polynomial time. This formulation was extended to the two-sided preferences model in [30]
and analyzed in [27] where half-integrality of the popular fractional matching polytope was shown.
Bounded Unpopularity Factor. A size-unpopularity factor trade-off in a marriage instance G = (A ∪ B,E)
was shown in [29]. Matchings with low unpopularity factor in dynamic matching markets were studied in [4]
where it was shown that O(∆)-unpopularity factor matchings can be maintained by making O(∆) changes
per round to the current matching, where ∆ is the max-degree in the graph. This holds in both one-sided
and two-sided preference models and also in the roommates model where the graph G need not be bipartite.
Popular matchings need not exist in a roommates instance G and it was shown in [26] that G always admits
a matching with unpopularity factor O(log n) and there are indeed instances where every matching has
unpopularity factor Ω(log n).
Hardness results. It was recently shown [12,21] that it is NP-hard to decide if a roommates instance admits
a popular matching or not. Several hardness results for popular matchings in a marriage instance G were
shown in [12]: these include (i) the hardness of deciding if G admits a popular matching that is neither
a stable nor a dominant matching and (ii) the hardness of deciding if G admits a popular matching that
contains/forbids two given edges e and e′. This showed that it is NP-hard to compute a max-utility popular
matching when edge utilities are non-negative; this problem admits a 2-approximation and it is NP-hard to
approximate it to a better factor [12].
When all popular matchings in G have the same size, some hardness results for stable/popular matchings
were shown in [10]: these include deciding if G admits a popular matching that is not dominant and if G has
a stable matching that is also dominant.
Bi-criteria approximation. Using the notation of bi-criteria approximation algorithms (see e.g. [33]), our algo-
rithm (from Theorem 2) is a (1, 2) approximation for the min-cost popular matching problem, where the first
entry denotes the ratio to the cost of the min-cost popular matching, and the second the unpopularity factor.
Bi-criteria approximation algorithms have been developed for e.g. bounded-degree spanning tree [18,43] and
k-means [33] problems. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time that such an algorithm is proposed
for a matching problem under preferences.
Polytopes and Complexity. Linear programming is a classical tool for solving combinatorial optimization
problems in general, and matching problems in particular, see e.g. [7,8,19,42]. Much research has been
devoted to give complete linear descriptions (of polynomial size) for polytopes associated to those problems,
or showing lower bounds on the size of any such description. Although intuitively one expects those bounds
to be related to the complexity of the associated optimization problems, this is not always the case: e.g., the
matching polytope does not have a compact extended formulation [40]. It is also not true that NP-hardness
proofs imply strong lower bounds on the extension complexity: e.g., there exists an O(
√
n)-approximated
extended formulation of polynomial size for the independent set polytope of a graph on n vertices [3] despite
the strong hardness results [23] on the problem.
2 Preliminaries
Our input is a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) on n vertices and m edges, where each vertex ranks its
neighbors in a strict preference order. We now give a brief overview of some useful known results.
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Given any matching M in G, for any edge (a, b) /∈ M , define votea(b,M) as follows: (here M(a) is a’s
partner in the matching M and M(a) = null if a is unmatched)
votea(b,M) =
{
+ if a prefers b to M(a);
− if a prefers M(a) to b.
We similarly define voteb(a,M). Label every edge (a, b) /∈ M by (votea(b,M), voteb(a,M)). Thus, every
edge outside M has a label in {(±,±)}, and it is labeled (+,+) if and only if it blocks M .
Let G˜ be the graph G augmented with self-loops. That is, we assume each vertex is its own last choice
neighbor. So we can henceforth regard any matching M in G as a perfect matching M˜ in G˜ by adding
self-loops for all vertices left unmatched in M . The following edge weight function wtM in G˜ will be useful
to us. For any edge (a, b) in G, define:
wtM (a, b) =

2 if (a, b) is labeled (+,+);
−2 if (a, b) is labeled (−,−);
0 if (a, b) ∈M or labeled otherwise.
For any u ∈ A∪B, let wtM (u, u) = 0 if u is left unmatched in M , else wtM (u, u) = −1. For any matching
N in G, wtM (N˜) is the difference in the number of votes for N and for M in their head-to-head election,
i.e., wtM (N˜) = φ(N,M)− φ(M,N).
Hence M is popular in G if and only if every perfect matching in the graph G˜ (with edge weights given
by wtM ) has weight at most 0. Equivalently, M is popular if and only if M˜ is an optimal solution to the
max-weight perfect matching problem in G˜ (since wtM (M˜) = 0). The characterization given below follows
from LP-duality and total unimodularity of the system.
Theorem 5 ([30,31]). A matching M in G = (A ∪ B,E) is popular if and only if there exists a vector
α ∈ {0,±1}n such that ∑u∈A∪B αu = 0,
αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b) ∀ (a, b) ∈ E and
αu ≥ wtM (u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B.
For any popular matching M , a vector α ∈ {0,±1}n as given in Theorem 5 will be called M ’s witness. A
popular matching may have several witnesses. Any stable matching M has 0 as a witness, since wtM (e) ≤ 0
for all e ∈ E˜.
For any matching M , let GM be the graph obtained from G by removing edges labeled (−,−). Dominant
matchings admit the following easy characterization.
Theorem 6 ([11]). A popular matching M is dominant iff there is no M -augmenting path in GM .
Any maximum-size popular (hence any dominant) matching matches the same subset of vertices and in
fact, a vertex left unmatched in a dominant matching is left unmatched in every popular matching in G [24].
Call a vertex v popular if it is matched in any max-size popular matching, else call v unpopular. Similarly,
we call a vertex v stable if it is matched in some (equivalently, every [16]) stable matching in G, else call v
unstable. It is known that every popular matching in G matches all stable vertices [25].
The LP-based characterization of dominant matchings given below follows from their combinatorial char-
acterization in [11].
Theorem 7 ([11]). A popular matching M in G = (A ∪ B,E) is dominant if and only if M admits a
witness α such that αv ∈ {±1} for every popular vertex v.
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3 Hardness of finding a min-cost quasi-popular matching
We prove Theorem 1 in this section. We show a reduction from 3SAT. Given a 3SAT formula ψ on n variables,
we construct a marriage instance Gψ, and a cost function on the edges. At a high level, this construction
resembles the structure of the instance used in [10] to show the hardness of deciding if a marriage instance
admits a stable matching that is also dominant. However, our proof is much more involved, and requires the
introduction of new tools.
In fact, the hardness reductions from [10] heavily rely on the combinatorial characterizations of sta-
ble/popular matchings in terms of certain forbidden induced structures. As mentioned in Section 1, such
a characterization is not known for quasi-popular matchings. We therefore first devise an understanding of
witnesses for quasi-popular matchings as shown below.
Our witness. Let G = (A∪B,E) be a marriage instance and let M be any matching in G. Recall the edge
labels in {(±,±)} from Section 2. Based on these labels, we will now define an edge weight function gM in
G as follows:
gM (e) =

+2 if e is labeled (+,+)
−4 if e is labeled (−,−)
−1 if e is labeled (+,−) or (−,+)
0 if e ∈M .
Note that in the above edge weight function, a vote of “−” gets scaled by a factor of 2 to become a -2
while a vote of “+” remains a +1. This is because in an election between M and a rival matching, a “−” is a
vote for M and against the rival matching while a “+” is a vote for the rival matching Also, gM (e) = 0 for
all e ∈M since both vertices vote “0” for each other: both endpoints of e are indifferent between M and the
rival matching since each of them gets assigned the same partner in both the matchings.
Let G˜ be the graph G augmented with self-loops, i.e., each vertex is assumed to be its own last choice
neighbor. Thus any matchingM inG becomes a perfect matching M˜ in G˜ by including self-loops at all vertices
left unmatched in M . The edge weight function gM can be extended to self-loops as well: let gM (u, u) = 0
if u is matched to itself in M˜ , else gM (u, u) = −2.
Thus gM is an edge weight function in G˜ and the following claim is easy to show.
Claim 1 For any matching N in G, we have gM (N˜) = φ(N,M)− 2φ(M,N).
Thus a matching M in G satisfies u(M) ≤ 2 if and only if every perfect matching in G˜ with edge weight
function gM has weight at most 0. Consider the max-weight perfect matching LP in G˜ = (A ∪B, E˜): this is
LP1 given below in variables xe for e ∈ E˜ = E ∪ {(u, u) : u ∈ A ∪ B}. The linear program LP2 is the dual
of LP1. The dual variables are αu for u ∈ A ∪B.
maximize
∑
e∈E˜
gM (e) · xe (LP1)
subject to ∑
e∈δ(u)∪{(u,u)}
xe = 1 ∀u ∈ A ∪B
xe ≥ 0 ∀ e ∈ E˜.
minimize
∑
u∈A∪B
αu (LP2)
subject to
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αa + αb ≥ gM (a, b) ∀ (a, b) ∈ E
αu ≥ gM (u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B.
Given a matchingM , if we can show a a feasible solution α ∈ Rn to LP2 such that∑u∈A∪B αu = 0, then
the optimal value of LP1 is at most 0, so we have φ(N,M) − 2φ(M,N) ≤ 0 for all N , i.e., u(M) ≤ 2. Let
us call such a vector α a witness for quasi-popularity. Interestingly, every quasi-popular matching admits a
simple witness as shown below.
Lemma 1. If M is a quasi-popular matching in G then M has a witness α ∈ {0,±1,±2}n.
Proof. Since M is quasi-popular, the optimal value of LP1 is at most 0 and so M˜ is an optimal solution to
LP1 (because gM (M˜) = 0). Since G is bipartite, the constraint matrix of LP2 is totally unimodular (note
that adding self-loops does not change this fact). Thus LP2 has an integral optimal solution α. We have
αu ≥ gM (u, u) ≥ −2 for all u. Complementary slackness implies αu + αv = gM (u, v) = 0 for each edge
(u, v) ∈M . Thus αu = −αv ≤ 2 for every vertex u matched in M . Regarding any vertex u left unmatched in
M , we have (u, u) ∈ M˜ , so αu = gM (u, u) = 0 (by complementary slackness). Hence α ∈ {0,±1,±2}n. uunionsq
3.1 Our reduction from 3SAT
As mentioned earlier, the overall construction of Gψ resembles one from [10]. It will be useful to perform
a simple transformation of the 3SAT formula ψ so that the transformed formula has a unique occurrence
of each negative literal. This property is easily accomplished: let X1, . . . , Xn be the n variables in ψ. For
each i, replace all occurrences of ¬Xi in ψ with Xn+i, i.e., a single new variable. The clauses Xi ∨Xn+i and
¬Xi ∨ ¬Xn+i are added to capture ¬Xi ⇐⇒ Xn+i.
So if the original formula ψ was C1 ∧ · · · ∧Cm, the transformed formula ψ = C1 ∧ · · · ∧Cm ∧Cm+1 ∧ · · · ∧
Cm+n∧Dm+n+1∧· · ·∧Dm+2n, where C1, . . . , Cm are the original m clauses with negated literals substituted
by new variables and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Cm+i is the clause Xi ∨Xn+i and Dm+n+i is the clause ¬Xi ∨ ¬Xn+i.
Gψ is essentially the parallel composition of clause gadgets, all sharing exactly vertices s and t. A positive
clause gadget corresponds to one of the Ci’s and a negative clause gadget corresponds to one of the Di’s. Each
clause gadget is a series composition of literal gadgets. The gadgets corresponding to positive and negative
literals are different and included in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 1. A gadget corresponding to a positive literal (left) and to a negative literal (right) of a variable r. We use
cr, dr, c
′
r, d
′
r to denote the 4 vertices in the negative gadget of r (there is a unique clause with ¬r). For the sake of
convenience, we use ar, br, a′r, b′r to denote the 4 vertices in the positive gadget of r in the `-th clause. Dashed edges
have cost 1 and bold edges have cost 0.
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We now describe the preference lists of vertices in a positive clause C` = x ∨ y ∨ z (see Fig. 2). We first
describe the preference lists of u`, v`, u′`, v
′
`, u
′′
` , v
′′
` .
u` : v`  s u′` : v′`  bx u′′` : v′′`  by
v` : ax  u` v′` : ay  u′` v′′` : az  u′′`
Thus u` has 2 neighbors: v` (top choice) and s (second choice). Other preference lists are analogous.
Recall that we assumed x to be the first literal, y to be the second literal, and z to be the third literal in
C`. We next describe the preference lists of the 4 vertices ax, bx, a′x, b′x that occur in x’s gadget in C`.
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Fig. 2. A clause gadget corresponding to a positive clause C` = x ∨ y ∨ z. The endpoints of this path, i.e., s and t,
are common to all clauses. The bold edges have cost 0 while the dashed edges have cost 1.
ax : b
′
x  v`  bx a′x : bx  b′x  d′x
bx : u
′
`  ax  cx  a′x b′x : a′x  ax
The underlined vertices cx and d′x will occur in the gadget of ¬x (similarly for vertices cy,d′y,cz,d′z below).
Below are the preference lists of the 4 vertices ay, by, a′y, b′y that occur in y’s gadget in C`.
ay : b
′
y  v′`  by a′y : by  b′y  d′y
by : u
′′
`  ay  cy  a′y b′y : a′y  ay
The preference lists of the 4 vertices az, bz, a′z, b′z that occur in z’s gadget in C` are given below.
az : b
′
z  v′′`  bz a′z : bz  b′z  d′z
bz : az  cz  a′z  t b′z : a′z  az
The preference lists of s and t are arbitrary (they do not matter for our arguments). The preference lists
of vertices that occur in a clause gadget with 2 positive literals will be totally analogous to the preference
lists of vertices in a clause gadget with 3 positive literals. In more detail, the edge (u′′` , v
′′
` ) will be missing
and so will the third literal gadget. In particular, the vertex t will be adjacent to the b-vertex in the gadget
of the second literal and t will be the last choice of this b-vertex.
We will now describe the preference lists of vertices in a negative clause k—the overall picture here (see
Fig. 3) will be the mirror image of a clause gadget with 2 positive literals. For a gadget Dk = ¬x ∨ ¬y, we
have:
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uk : dx  vk u′k : dy  v′k
vk : uk  cy v′k : u′k  t
We describe below the preference lists of the 4 vertices cx, dx, c′x, d′x that occur in the first literal gadget
in the clause Dk, which is ¬x’s (unique) gadget.
cx : dx  bi  bj  · · ·  b`  d′x  s c′x : d′x  dx
dx : c
′
x  uk  cx d′x : a′i  a′j  · · ·  a′`  cx  c′x
The underlined vertices bi, bj , . . . , b` in cx’s preference list are the b-vertices in the x-gadgets in various
clauses. The order among these vertices in cx’s preference list is not important. Similarly, a′i, a′j , . . . , a′` in
d′x’s preference list are the a′-vertices in the gadgets of x that occur in various clauses and the order among
these is not important.
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Fig. 3. A clause gadget corresponding to a negative clause Dk = ¬x ∨ ¬y: every negative clause has only 2 literals.
We describe next the preference lists of the 4 vertices cy, dy, c′y, d′y that occur in the second literal gadget
in Dk, which is ¬y’s (unique) gadget.
cy : vk  dy  bi′  bj′  · · ·  b`′  d′y c′y : d′y  dy
dy : c
′
y  u′k  cy d′y : a′i′  a′j′  · · ·  a′`′  cy  c′y
Edge costs. For each edge e in Gψ, we will set cost(e) ∈ {0, 1}.
– Set cost(e) = 0 where e is any of the u-v, u′-v′, and u′′-v′′ edges.
– Set cost(e) = 0 where e is an intra-gadget edge.
– For all other edges e, set cost(e) = 1.
In particular, for all edges e incident to s and t, we have cost(e) = 1. Similarly, for any edge e between r’s
gadget and ¬r’s gadget for any variable r, we have cost(e) = 1. In our figures all dashed edges have cost 1
and the bold edges have cost 0.
Theorem 8. If ψ is satisfiable then Gψ admits a quasi-popular matching M with cost(M) = 0.
Proof. There is a natural way of constructing the matching M in our instance Gψ. Include all u-v, u′-v′,
and u′′-v′′ edges in M . Then, we will use the satisfying assignment for ψ to choose edges from each literal
gadget. For any variable r ∈ {X1, . . . , X2n}:
– if r = true then take the pair of edges (cr, dr), (c′r, d′r) from ¬r’s gadget and the pair of edges (ar,i, b′r,i),
(a′r,i, br,i) from r’s gadget in clause i (for every clause that r belongs to).
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– if r = false then take the pair of edges (cr, d′r), (c′r, dr) from ¬r’s gadget and the pair of edges (ar,i, br,i),
(a′r,i, b
′
r,i) from r’s gadget in clause i (for every clause that r belongs to).
It is easy to see that cost(M) = 0. We will now show a witness α ∈ {0,±1,±2}n to show u(M) ≤ 2.
Since s and t are unmatched in M , we will set αs = αt = 0. This will ensure that αu ≥ gM (u, u) for all
vertices u since αv = 0 = gM (v, v) for v ∈ {s, t} while αu ≥ −2 = gM (u, u) for all vertices u matched in M .
We now set α-values for vertices matched in M . Consider any negative clause, say Dk = ¬x ∨ ¬y. Note
that a satisfying assignment sets exactly one of x, y to be true (this is by our transformation of the formula
ψ: if x = Xi then y = Xn+i = ¬Xi). Thus we have two cases here: either (i) x = true and y = false, or
(ii) x = false and y = true.
Let cx, dx, c′x, d′x be the 4 vertices in ¬x’s gadget and let cy, dy, c′y, d′y be the 4 vertices in ¬y’s gadget.
The α-values of these 8 vertices and along with those of uk, vk, u′k, v
′
k in cases (i) and (ii) are given below.
αcx αdx αc′x αd′x αuk αvk αcy αdy αc′y αd′y αu′k αv′k
case (i) −1 1 −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 1 −1 0 0
case (ii) 1 −1 1 −1 0 0 −1 1 −1 1 1 −1
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Fig. 4. The α-values we assigned in case (i) for the gadget corresponding to Dk = ¬x ∨ ¬y are indicated next to
vertices. The bold edges are in M and (dx, uk) is a blocking edge to M .
It is easy to check that all intra-gadget edges (those with both endpoints in Dk) are covered by the above
assignment of α-values, i.e., αp + αq ≥ gM (p, q) for every edge (p, q). See Fig. 4 for an illustration.
– The edges (uk, vk) and (u′k, v
′
k) are covered. Similarly, the edges in the 4-cycles of gadgets of ¬x and ¬y
are covered: for any such edge e, we have gM (e) ∈ {−1, 0} and sum of α-values of endpoints of e is 0.
– When x = true, the edge (cx, dx) ∈M and so gM (dx, uk) = 2 and we have αdx = αuk = 1. Then y = false,
the edges (cy, d′y), (c′y, dy) are in M and so gM (cy, vk) = gM (dy, u′k) = −1. It is easy to see that these
edges are covered.
– When x = false, the edge (c′x, dx) ∈ M and so gM (dx, uk) = −1 = αdx + αuk . Then y = true and the
edge (cy, dy) ∈M and so gM (cy, vk) = −1 = αvk + αcy while gM (dy, u′k) = 2 = αdy + αu′k .
– The edges incident to s and t are covered in all cases.
Consider any positive clause, say C` = x ∨ y ∨ z with 3 literals. We have three cases here: (i) x = true,
(ii) x = false and y = true, (iii) x = y = false and z = true. For a positive clause with 2 literals, only cases (i)
and (ii) occur.
Let ax, bx, a′x, b′x be the 4 vertices in x’s gadget in C` and let ay, by, a′y, b′y be the 4 vertices in y’s gadget
in C`. The α-values of these 8 vertices along with those of u`, v`, u′`, v
′
`, and u
′′
` , v
′′
` in cases (i)-(iii) are given
below.
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αu` αv` αax αbx αa′x αb′x αu′` αv′` αay αby αa′y αb′y αu′′` αv′′`
case (i) 0 0 −1 1 −1 1 −2 2 0 0 0 0 −1 1
case (ii) −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1
case (iii) −1 1 1 −1 1 −1 0 0 2 −2 2 −2 1 −1
Let az, bz, a′z, b′z be the 4 vertices in z’s gadget in C`: α-values of these 4 vertices in cases (i)-(iii) are
described below.
– In case (i) and case (ii), z could be either true or false: if z = true then set αaz = αbz = αa′z = αb′z = 0,
else set αaz = αa′z = 1 and αbz = αb′z = −1.
– In case (iii), z = true: set αaz = αbz = αa′z = αb′z = 0.
See Fig. 5 for the assignment of α-values in case (iii).
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Fig. 5. The α-values we assigned in case (iii) for the gadget corresponding to C` = x ∨ y ∨ z are indicated next to
vertices. The bold edges are in M and the edges (ax, v`) and (ay, v′`) are blocking edges to M .
In the 3 cases above, it is easy to check that all edges in the 4-cycles corresponding to literal gadgets are
covered by the above assignment of α-values. Similarly, the u-v, u′-v′, u′′-v′′ edges are covered and the edges
incident to s and t are also covered.
Claim 2 below shows that every link edge (such as (v`, ax) and (bx, u′`)) is also covered.
Claim 2 Every link edge is also covered in the 3 cases given above.
Proof. Consider case (i): here the edges (ax, b′x) and (a′x, bx) are in M . So gM (ax, v`) = −1 = αv` + αax . We
have gM (bx, u′`) = −1 = αbx + αu′` . Regarding the other two literal gadgets:
– We have gM (ay, v′`) ≤ 2 = αay + αv′` . Similarly, gM (by, u′′` ) = −1 = αby + αu′′` .
– If z = false, then gM (az, v′′` ) = 2 = αaz + αv′′` ; else gM (az, v
′′
` ) = −1 ≤ αaz + αv′′` .
Consider case (ii): here the edge (ax, bx) ∈M . So the edge (ax, v`) is a blocking edge to M and we have
αax = αv` = 1.
– We have the edges (ay, b′y) and (a′y, by) in M , thus gM (bx, u′`) = gM (ay, v
′
`) = gM (by, u
′′
` ) = −1. It is easy
to check that all these edges are covered.
– If z = false, then gM (az, v′′` ) = 2 = αaz + αv′′` ; else gM (az, v
′′
` ) = −1 ≤ αaz + αv′′` .
Consider case (iii): here the edges (ax, bx) and (ay, by) are inM . So both (ax, v`) and (ay, v′`) are blocking
edges to M . We have αax = αv` = 1 and αay = 2 and αv′` = 0. So the blocking edges are covered.
– We also have gM (bx, u′`) = gM (by, u
′′
` ) = −1 and we set αbx = −1, αu′` = 0 along with αby = −2, αu′′` = 1.
Thus these edges are covered.
– Finally, gM (az, v′′` ) = −1 and we set αaz = 0 and αv′′` = −1. Thus all link edges are covered. uunionsq
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Claim 3 below shows that edges between r’s gadget and ¬r’s gadget, for any variable r, are also covered.
Claim 3 For any variable r, edges between r’s gadget and ¬r’s gadget are covered.
Proof. Suppose r = false in this assignment. Then we have αcr = 1 and αd′r = −1. We always have αbr ≥ −2.
Note that gM (br, cr) = −1, so αbr + αcr ≥ −1 = gM (br, cr). It is easy to check that, by construction of
α-values, when r = false, we have αa′r ≥ 0. Similarly, gM (a′r, d′r) = −1, so αa′r + αd′r ≥ −1 = gM (a′r, d′r).
Suppose r = true in this assignment. Then we have αcr = −1 and αd′r = 1. We always have αa′r ≥ −2 (in
fact, we have αa′r ≥ −1), thus αa′r + αd′r ≥ −1 = gM (a′r, d′r). It is easy to check that when r = true, we have
αbr ≥ 0, thus αbr + αcr ≥ −1 = gM (br, cr). uunionsq
Thus α is a feasible solution to LP2. Moreover,
∑
w αw = 0 since for each edge (p, q) ∈ M , we have
αp + αq = 0, also αs = αt = 0. This finishes the proof of Theorem 8. uunionsq
We also need to show that if Gψ admits a quasi-popular matching of cost 0, then ψ admits a satisfying
assignment. This is the easy side of the reduction.
Lemma 2. Let M be any quasi-popular matching in Gψ with cost(M) = 0. Then M contains all u-v, u′-v′,
and u′′-v′′ edges. For any r ∈ {X1, . . . , X2n}, we have:
1. From a gadget of r (on vertices ar, br, a′r, b′r), either (i) (ar, b′r), (a′r, br) are in M or (ii) (ar, br), (a′r, b′r)
are in M .
– If (i) happens, we say that r is in true state. If (ii) happens, we say that r is in false state.
2. From a gadget of ¬r (on vertices cr, dr, c′r, d′r), either (i) (cr, d′r), (c′r, dr) are in M or (ii) (cr, dr), (c′r, d′r)
are in M .
– If (i) happens, we say that ¬r is in true state. If (ii) happens, we say that ¬r is in false state.
3. r and ¬r cannot be simultaneously in true state.
Proof. Since cost(M) = 0, M is forbidden to use any edge other than the u-v edges, u′-v′ edges, the u′′-v′′
edges, and the 4 edges in the gadget of any literal. Moreover, since M is quasi-popular, M cannot leave two
adjacent vertices unmatched. Thus M contains all u-v, u′-v′ edges, and u′′-v′′ edges; similarly, points 1 and
2 follow.
The preferences of the vertices are set such that if both (a′r, br) and (cr, d′r) are inM then the alternating
cycle ρ = a′r − br − cr − d′r − a′r (see Fig. 1) has a blocking edge (br, cr) in it.
Consider M ⊕ ρ versus M . The 3 vertices br, cr, and d′r prefer M ⊕ ρ to M while the vertex a′r prefers
M to M ⊕ ρ. This means M ’s unpopularity factor is at least 3, i.e., u(M) ≥ 3. However M is quasi-popular,
i.e., u(M) ≤ 2, thus both (a′r, br) and (cr, d′r) cannot simultaneously be in M for any r ∈ {X1, . . . , X2n}. uunionsq
Lemma 2 indicates a natural way of defining an assignment for ψ using a matching M with cost 0 and
unpopularity factor at most 2.
Lemma 3. If Gψ has a quasi-popular matching M with cost(M) = 0 then ψ is satisfiable.
Proof. For any variable r ∈ {X1, . . . , X2n} consider the edges in ¬r’s gadget that are in M . If (cr, d′r) and
(c′r, dr) are in M then set r = false else set r = true.
Lemma 2 tells us that when r = false then for every clause i that r is present in, the edges (ar,i, br,i)
and (a′r,i, b′r,i) from r’s gadget in the i-th clause are in M (where ar,i, br,i, a′r,i, b′r,i are the 4 vertices from r’s
gadget in the i-th clause). We now need to show that every clause has at least one literal set to true. Suppose
not. We have 3 cases here.
1. Let Ci = x ∨ y ∨ z. Suppose x, y, z are in false state. Consider the following alternating path ρ wrt M :
s− (ui, vi)− (ax,i, bx,i)− (u′i, v′i)− (ay,i, by,i)− (u′′i , v′′i )− (az,i, bz,i)− t.
In the election between M ⊕ ρ and M , the 10 vertices s, vi, ax,i, bx,i, v′i, ay,i, by,i, v′′i , az,i, and t vote for
M ⊕ ρ while the 4 vertices ui, u′i, u′′i , and bz,i vote for M . Thus φ(M ⊕ ρ,M) = 10 and φ(M,M ⊕ ρ) = 4.
Hence u(M) ≥ 10/4 contradicting that u(M) ≤ 2.
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2. Let Cj = x ∨ y, i.e., this is a positive clause with 2 literals. Suppose both x and y are in false state.
Consider the following alternating path ρ wrt M :
s− (uj , vj)− (ax,j , bx,j)− (u′j , v′j)− (ay,j , by,j)− t.
In the election between M ⊕ ρ and M , the 7 vertices s, vj , ax,j , bx,j , v′j , ay,j , and t vote for M ⊕ ρ while
the 3 vertices u,u′j , and by,j vote forM . Thus φ(M⊕ρ,M) = 7 and φ(M,M⊕ρ) = 3. Hence u(M) ≥ 7/3
contradicting that u(M) ≤ 2.
3. Let Dk = ¬x ∨ ¬y. Suppose both ¬x and ¬y are in false state. Consider the following alternating path
ρ wrt M :
s− (cx, dx)− (uk, vk)− (cy, dy)− (u′k, v′k)− t.
In the election between M ⊕ ρ and M , the 7 vertices s, dx, uk, cy, dy, u′k, and t vote for M ⊕ ρ while the
3 vertices cx, vk, and v′k vote for M . Thus φ(M ⊕ ρ,M) = 7 and φ(M,M ⊕ ρ) = 3. Hence u(M) ≥ 7/3
contradicting that u(M) ≤ 2. uunionsq
This finishes the proof of correctness of our reduction. Hence Theorem 1 follows.
3.2 Lower bounds on the extension complexity
We prove Theorem 3 in this section. Recall that, given polytopes P1 ⊆ Rk, P2 ⊆ R` and an affine map
f : R` → Rk such that f(P2) = P1, we say that P2 is an extension of P1. The number of facets of P2 (or
equivalently, the number of inequalities in a minimal description that are not valid at equality) is its size,
and the minimum size of an extension of P1 is the extension complexity of P1, denoted by xc(P1).
Our starting point in the proof of Theorem 3 is the following lower bound on the extension complexity
of the independent set polytope. Let IH be the independent set polytope of a graph H.
Theorem 9 ([20]). There exists an (explicitly constructed) family of graphs H = (V,E) with bounded degree
such that xc(IH) = 2Ω(|V |/ log |V |).
Given a SAT formula ψ on n variables, let C(ψ) be the convex hull of all vectors x ∈ {0, 1}n such that
ψ(x) = 1 where, as usual, for i ∈ [n], xi = 1 corresponds to the i-th variable being set to true. It is now easy to
construct a family of 2SAT instances ψ with n variables and O(n) clauses such that xc(C(ψ)) = 2Ω(n/ logn):
indeed, every independent set instance H = (V,E) can be formulated as a 2SAT instance ψ with n = |V |
variables x1, . . . , xn and clauses (¬xi ∨ ¬xj) iff (i, j) ∈ E. Since the hard instances from Theorem 9 have
bounded degree, the number of clauses in the 2SAT instance we create is linear in the number of variables.
Now apply the sequence of reductions from Section 3, transforming the 2SAT instance ψ with n variables
and Θ(n) clauses into an equivalent 2SAT instance with Θ(n) variables and clauses, and then defining the
min-cost quasi-popular matching instance Gψ on Θ(n) vertices and Θ(n) edges defined in Section 3. The
reduction from Section 3 assumed that ψ was a 3SAT instance but it clearly applies to a 2SAT instance as
well.
Recall the edge cost function cost defined in Section 3. Consider the following face F of the quasi-popular
matching polytope Q of Gψ, where F = {z ∈ Q : cost(z) = 0}. Our goal is to define a linear surjective map
h from the face F defined above to C(ψ). Hence, given an extension T for Q, we obtain that
C(ψ) = {x : x = h(z), (z, y) ∈ T , cost(z) = 0}.
Therefore, an extension of small size for Q would imply the existence of an extension of small size for C(ψ).
The lower bound on the extension complexity of C(ψ) will therefore imply the claimed bound.
We will need the following properties:
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1. LetM be a matching that belongs to F . Thus cost(M) = 0. Let S be the following true/false assignment
to the variables in ψ. For i ∈ [n]:
S(xi) =
{
false if (ci, d′i) ∈M ;
true otherwise.
It can be shown that S satisfies ψ. This follows from the easy side of the hardness reduction given in
Section 3.
2. Let S be a satisfying assignment for ψ. As shown in the proof of Theorem 8, there is a matching M ∈ F
with the following properties:
for i ∈ [n] : (ci, d′i) ∈M ⇐⇒ S(xi) = false.
Define the mapping h from F to C(ψ) as: for z ∈ F , let h(z) = x where xi = 1 − z((ci, d′i)) for i ∈ [n].
Part 1 above implies that, if z is a vertex of F , then h(z) is a satisfying assignment. Together with part 2,
we deduce h(F ) = C(ψ). Thus we can conclude that xc(Q) ≥ 2Ω(n/ logn). Since the number of edges of Gψ
is Θ(n), the bound follows.
The lower bound on xc(P) is analogous to the above proof. For this lower bound, we will use an NP-
hardness result from [10] that showed a polynomial time reduction from 3SAT to the problem of finding a
min-size popular matching that is not stable in a marriage instance. Let us apply this construction on the
2SAT formula ψ on n variables and Θ(n) clauses. This results in a marriage instance Gψ on Θ(n) vertices
and Θ(n) edges (we refer to [10, Section 5.2] for the details). As before, Gψ has a unique gadget for each
negated literal ¬Xi.
Let F ′ be the convex hull of minimum-size popular matchings of Gψ that are not stable. The reduction
from [10] shows that F ′ is a face of the popular matching polytope P of Gψ. We now define a linear surjective
map g from F ′ to C(ψ) such that for z ∈ F ′, we have g(z) = x where for i ∈ [n]: xi = z(ei) for a certain
edge ei = (ci, di) in ¬Xi’s gadget in Gψ (this edge is analogous to the edge (cr, dr) in ¬r’s gadget in Fig. 3).
In a similar fashion as above, we can show that g(F ′) = C(ψ).
The map g allows us to conclude that xc(P) ≥ 2Ω(m/ logm). This finishes the proof of Theorem 3.
4 Our algorithm
We prove Theorem 2 in this section. Our input instance is G = (A ∪ B,E) and without loss of generality,
assume |A| ≥ |B|. The first step in our algorithm is an augmentation of the graph G into G∗ = (A∪B,E∗),
with E∗ ⊇ E. The new edges in E∗ are obtained by introducing edges between certain pairs of unstable
vertices and each new edge has cost 0. Given a popular matching M in G, we will use these new edges to
obtain an extension M∗ in G∗ such that M∗ is a dominant matching in G∗, see Lemma 5.
Moreover, M∗ satisfies some stronger condition on witnesses than a dominant matching (as given in
Theorem 7). Hence, we will call M∗ extra-dominant, see Definition 3. The second step of the algorithm is
to prove that, for every extra-dominant matching T in G∗, T ∩ E is a quasi-popular matching in G, see
Lemma 6.
The first two steps imply that in order to prove Theorem 2, it suffices to efficiently find a min-cost
extra-dominant matching (in G∗). We show how to do this by providing a compact extended formulation
of the extra-dominant matching polytope. In fact, we first describe an extension of the dominant matching
polytope of G∗, and then show that one of its faces is an extension of the extra-dominant matching polytope
of G∗. We also extend these arguments and provide an extended formulation for the dominant matching
polytope of G, which is a generic bipartite graph.
Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 are our technical lemmas here and their proofs are given in Section 4.3. The
proofs of correctness of our extended formulations are given in Section 4.4.
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4.1 The popular subgraph
The augmentation of G into G∗ is based on a certain subgraph of G called its “popular subgraph”. Call an
edge e in G = (A ∪ B,E) popular if there is some popular matching in G that contains e. Let EF ⊆ E be
the set of popular edges in G. The set EF can be computed in linear time, see [11]. Call FG = (A ∪B,EF )
the popular subgraph of G.
The subgraph FG need not be connected: let C1, . . . , Ch be the set of connected components in FG. Call
a component Ci non-trivial if |Ci| ≥ 2. The following observation will be useful.
Observation 1 For any non-trivial connected component Ci in the popular subgraph FG, the number of
unstable vertices in A ∩ Ci equals the number of unstable vertices in B ∩ Ci.
Indeed, every max-size popular matching M restricted to Ci is a perfect matching, since all max-size
popular matchings match the same set of vertices, while vertices left unmatched in any max-size popular
matching are left unmatched in all popular matchings (see the discussion in Section 2). Thus |A ∩ Ci| =
|B ∩Ci|. The number of stable vertices in A∩Ci equals the number of stable vertices in B ∩Ci, since every
stable matching matches stable vertices in Ci among themselves. Hence Observation 1 follows.
Lemma 4. Let Ci be any connected component in the popular subgraph FG. Any popular matching M in G
either matches all unstable vertices in Ci or none of them.
Proof. Let M be a popular matching in G. Consider the max-weight perfect matching LP (this is LP3 given
below) in G˜ with edge weight function wtM described in Section 2. Let E˜ = E ∪ {(u, u) : u ∈ A ∪B} be the
edge set of G˜.
maximize
∑
e∈E˜
wtM (e) · xe (LP3)
subject to ∑
e∈δ(u)∪{(u,u)}
xe = 1 ∀u ∈ A ∪B
xe ≥ 0 ∀ e ∈ E˜.
minimize
∑
u∈A∪B
αu (LP4)
subject to
αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b) ∀ (a, b) ∈ E
αu ≥ wtM (u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B.
Any popular matching in G is an optimal solution to LP3 and any witness of M is an optimal solution to
the dual LP (this is LP4 given above). So if (a, b) is a popular edge, then complementary slackness implies
that αa +αb = wtM (a, b), where α ∈ {0,±1}n is a witness of M . Since wtM (a, b) ∈ {0,±2}, αa and αb have
the same parity. So either αa = αb = 0 or αa, αb ∈ {±1}.
Let u be an unstable vertex in G. Let S be a stable matching in G. So the perfect matching S˜ contains the
self-loop (u, u). Since S˜ is an optimal solution to LP3, we have αu = wtM (u, u) by complementary slackness.
Thus αu = 0 if and only if u is left unmatched in M (otherwise αu = −1).
For any connected component Ci in FG, it follows from our first observation above that either (i) αu = 0
for all vertices u ∈ Ci or (ii) αu = ±1 for all vertices u ∈ Ci. For any unstable vertex u, we have αu =
wtM (u, u) (by our second observation above). Hence in case (i), all unstable vertices in Ci are left unmatched
in M and in case (ii), all unstable vertices in Ci are matched in M . uunionsq
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Let C1, . . . , Ck be the non-trivial connected components in FG. Consider Ci where i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We
know from Observation 1 that the number of unstable vertices in A∩Ci is the same as the number of unstable
vertices in B ∩Ci. Let a1, . . . , at be the unstable vertices in A∩Ci and let b1, . . . , bt be the unstable vertices
in B ∩ Ci. Compute an arbitrary pairing of a1, . . . , at with b1, . . . , bt — this partitions unstable vertices of
Ci into disjoint pairs, say (aj , bj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ t. Let Si be the set of these t pairs.
We also consider the trivial or singleton components in FG: each such component consists of a single
unpopular vertex, i.e., a vertex that is left unmatched in every popular matching. Since |A ∩ Ci| = |B ∩ Ci|
for every non-trivial component Ci and |A| ≥ |B|, there are at least as many unpopular vertices in A as in
B. We compute an arbitrary pairing S0 between unpopular vertices in A and in B. If |A| > |B| then some
unpopular vertices in A are left out of S0.
The instance G∗ = (A ∪B,E∗) is defined as follows: E∗ = ∪ki=0Si ∪E. So G∗ is the graph G augmented
with new edges (a, b) in ∪ki=0Si. Preference lists of vertices in G∗ are the same as in G, except for unstable
vertices in G, some of whom have acquired a new neighbor in G∗. For any unstable vertex u with a new
neighbor v in G∗, the vertex v is at the tail of u’s preference list, i.e., v is u’s least preferred neighbor in G∗.
The matchingM∗. LetM be any popular matching inG. Lemma 4 tells us that for any edge (a, b) ∈ ∪ki=1Si,
either both a and b are matched in M or neither is matched in M . This is also true for (a, b) ∈ S0, since in
this case both a and b are left unmatched in M . Define M∗ as follows:
M∗ =M ∪ {(a, b) ∈ ∪ki=0Si such that a and b are unmatched in M}.
It is easy to see that M∗ is a B-perfect matching in G∗. Let U∗ be the set of unstable vertices in G∗. So
U∗ ⊆ A, in fact, U∗ ⊆ UA, where UA is the set of unstable vertices in G that are in A.
A stable matching in G∗ is B-perfect and a max-size matching. Hence all popular matchings in G∗ match
the same set of vertices: this is the set (A∪B) \U∗. Thus U∗ is the set of unpopular vertices in G∗. We now
define a subclass of dominant matchings in G∗.
Definition 3 A popular matching T in G∗ = (A ∪ B,E∗) is extra-dominant if T admits a witness α such
that αv ∈ {±1} for every popular vertex v and αa = −1 for all a ∈ UA \ U∗.
We call a witness as in Definition 3 extra-dominant. Note that every extra-dominant matching is also
dominant, by the LP-based characterization of dominant matchings (given by Theorem 7).
Lemma 5. For any popular matching M in G, the matching M∗ is extra-dominant in G∗.
Lemma 6. For any extra-dominant matching T in G∗, T ∩ E is a quasi-popular matching in G.
4.2 Extended formulations of the dominant and extra-dominant matching polytopes
We will now show extended formulations of the dominant and extra-dominant matching polytopes of G∗.
For any fractional matching x in G∗, we will use the following edge weight function cx in G∗. For (a, b) ∈ E
where a ∈ U∗, let cx(a, b) = 1. For (a, b) ∈ E∗ where a /∈ U∗, let:
cx(a, b) =
( ∑
b′:b′≺ab
xab′ −
∑
b′:b′ab
xab′
)
+
( ∑
a′:a′≺ba
xa′b −
∑
a′:a′ba
xa′b
)
, (1)
where for any edge (u, v), {v′ : v′ ≺u v} is the set of neighbors of u ranked worse than v and {v′ : v′ u v}
is the set of neighbors of u ranked better than v.
Thus for a /∈ U∗, cx(a, b) is the sum of fractional votes of a and b for each other versus their respective
assignments in x. The first term is a’s fractional vote for b versus its assignment in x and the second term
is b’s fractional vote for a versus its assignment in x. Observe that cx is an affine function of x.
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Call an edge e in G∗ dominant if there is some dominant matching in G∗ that contains e. Let E∗D denote
the set of dominant edges in G∗. The set E∗D can be determined in linear time, see [11]. Consider the polytope
FG∗ in variables x and α defined by constraints (2)–(9) given below. Here δ∗(u) is the set of edges incident
to vertex u in G∗. Linear programming on FG∗ gives us a min-cost extra-dominant matching in G∗.
αa + αb ≥ cx(a, b) ∀(a, b) ∈ E∗ (2)
αu ≥ −1 ∀u ∈ A ∪B (3)∑
u∈A∪B
αu = 0 (4)
αa = 0 ∀a ∈ U∗ (5)
xe = 0 ∀e ∈ E∗ \ E∗D (6)
xe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E∗D (7)∑
e∈δ∗(u)
xe = 1 ∀u ∈ (A ∪B) \ U∗ (8)
αa = −1 ∀a ∈ UA \ U∗ (9)
Theorem 10. The polytope FG∗ is an extension of the extra-dominant matching polytope of G∗.
Let CG∗ be the polytope defined by constraints (2)-(8). Theorem 11 will help us prove Theorem 10.
Theorem 11. The polytope CG∗ is an extension of the dominant matching polytope of G∗. Moreover, the
extreme points of CG∗ are all and only the vectors (IM ,α), where IM is the characteristic vector of a dominant
matching M and α is a witness of M such that αv ∈ {±1} for every popular vertex v.
The proof of Theorem 11 uses an extension EH of the popular fractional matching polytope of a marriage
instance H that admits a perfect stable matching – a compact description of EH was shown in [31,30] and
the integrality of EH in such an instance H was shown in [27]. We apply this with H = G∗ \ U∗ and CG∗ is
realized as a face of an extension of EH . The proofs of Theorem 10 and Theorem 11 are given in Section 4.4.
Recall that we are given a function cost on the edges of G. We set cost(e) = 0 for every new edge e in
G∗, i.e., cost(e) = 0 for all e ∈ ∪ki=0Si. All the old edges in G∗, i.e., those in E, inherit their edge costs from
G. For any matching T in G∗, note that cost(T ∩ E) = cost(T ).
We now sum up our algorithm that proves Theorem 2 stated in Section 1.
1. Identify all unstable vertices in G = (A ∪B,E) by running Gale-Shapley algorithm.
2. Determine the popular subgraph of G by computing all popular edges in G using [11].
3. Augment the graph G into the graph G∗ by adding edges in ∪ki=0Si as described earlier.
4. Compute a min-cost extra-dominant matching T in G∗ by solving a linear program over FG∗ .
5. Return T ∩ E.
It follows from Lemma 5 and Theorem 10 that cost(T ) ≤ opt where opt is the cost of a min-cost
popular matching in G. We know from Lemma 6 that T ∩ E is a quasi-popular matching in G. Since
cost(T ∩ E) = cost(T ) ≤ opt, the correctness of our algorithm follows.
4.3 Proofs of our technical lemmas
Proof of Lemma 5. Since M is popular in G, it has a witness α ∈ {0,±1}n such that ∑u αu = 0 and
(IM ,α) satisfies edge covering constraints as given in Theorem 5, where IM is the characteristic vector of
M . For any non-trivial connected component Ci in the subgraph FG, it follows from the proof of Lemma 4
that either (i) αu = 0 for all u ∈ Ci or (ii) αu ∈ {±1} for all u ∈ Ci.
We will now define a witness β that proves the popularity of M∗ in G∗. For any non-trivial connected
component Ci in FG do:
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– if αu ∈ {±1} for all u ∈ Ci then set βu = αu for all u ∈ Ci.
– if αu = 0 for all u ∈ Ci then set βa = −1 for all a ∈ A ∩ Ci and βb = 1 for all b ∈ B ∩ Ci.
We will now set β-values for vertices that are unpopular in G. These vertices are outside ∪ki=1Ci. We set
βb = 1 for all unpopular vertices b ∈ B and βa = −1 for all those unpopular vertices a ∈ A that have an
edge incident to them in S0. For each unpopular vertex a ∈ A that does not appear in S0 (so a is unmatched
in M∗), we set βa = 0. It is left to check that these β-values satisfy Theorem 5.
Observe first that
∑
(a,b)∈S0(βa + βb) = 0. For each edge (a, b) ∈M , we have αa + αb = 0 and it is easy
to see from our assignment of β-values that βa + βb = αa + αb = 0. Thus it follows that
∑
u∈A∪B βu = 0.
Edge-covering constraints. We will now show that βa + βb ≥ wtM∗(a, b) for all edges (a, b) in G∗ along with
βu ≥ wtM∗(u, u) for all vertices u, where the function wtM∗(e) was defined in Section 2. The constraints
βu ≥ wtM∗(u, u) for all vertices u are easy to see: either (i) βu = −1 which implies that u is matched in M∗
and so wtM∗(u, u) = −1 or (ii) βu ≥ 0 ≥ wtM∗(u, u).
We will now show edge covering constraints hold for all edges in G∗. It is easy to see that βa + βb ≥
wtM∗(a, b) for all the new edges (a, b) in G∗, i.e., for all (a, b) ∈ ∪ki=0Si. This is because either:
– both a and b are matched in M in which case wtM∗(a, b) = −2 and βa + βb ≥ −2 holds since βu ≥ −1
for all u, or
– both a and b are unmatched in M in which case (a, b) ∈ M∗ and so wtM∗(a, b) = 0 = βa + βb (recall
that βa = −1 and βb = 1 in this case).
We will now show that these constraints hold for all the old edges as well, i.e., for any (a, b) ∈ E. We
have αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b) and also wtM∗(a, b) = wtM (a, b). We have the following cases here:
– Suppose βa = αa. Since either βb = αb or βb = αb + 1, we have
βa + βb ≥ αa + αb ≥ wtM (a, b) = wtM∗(a, b) for such an edge (a, b).
– Suppose βa 6= αa. So βa = αa − 1. We have two sub-cases here.
(1) In the first sub-case, βb 6= αb. So βb = αb+1 and thus βa+βb = αa+αb. Since wtM∗(a, b) = wtM (a, b)
for all (a, b) ∈ E, it again follows that the above edge covering constraint holds for all such edges
(a, b).
(2) The other sub-case is βb = αb. So αb ∈ {±1} while αa = 0, thus αa + αb ∈ {±1}.
We have wtM∗(a, b) = wtM (a, b) ≤ αa + αb. Note that for any edge (a, b), the value wtM (a, b) ∈
{0,±2}. Thus wtM (a, b) is an even number, so the constraint wtM (a, b) ≤ αa + αb is slack and we
can tighten it to wtM (a, b) ≤ αa + αb − 1. In other words, we have:
wtM∗(a, b) = wtM (a, b) ≤ αa + αb − 1 = βa + βb.
Thus the edge covering constraints also hold for all (a, b) ∈ E. Hence β is a valid witness of M∗’s
popularity in G∗.
Since M∗ is B-perfect and popular, it is dominant. Moreover, by construction, we have βa = 0 if and
only if a is unmatched in M∗ and βa = −1 for every a ∈ UA \ U∗. Hence, M∗ has a desired witness β, so
M∗ is extra-dominant. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 6. Let N be any matching in G. Let T ′ = T ∩E. Matchings N and T ′ can be viewed as
matchings in G∗ as well since E∗ ⊇ E. Since T is popular in G∗, φG∗(T,N) ≥ φG∗(N,T ), where φG∗ is the
function φ in the graph G∗.
Let W be the set of unstable vertices in G that get matched along new edges (i.e., those in E∗ \E) in T
but are left unmatched in N .
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– We have φG∗(T ′, N) = φG∗(T,N)− |W |. The vertices in W used to vote for T versus N , however they
are now indifferent between T ′ and N because both T ′ and N leave them unmatched.
– We also have φG∗(N,T ′) = φG∗(N,T ). Indeed, if a vertex did not prefer N to T , then it is either
unmatched in N or it was matched in T by an edge in E (since edges from E∗ \ E are at the end of
every vertex’s preference list), hence it is matched via the same edge in T ′.
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Fig. 6. The blue bold edges are in T while the black dashed edges are in N . In the figure on the left, both the
endpoints of p are in W while in the figure on the right, exactly one endpoint of p (i.e., a2) is in W .
Since both T ′ and N are matchings in G, we have φG∗(T ′, N) = φ(T ′, N) and φG∗(N,T ′) = φ(N,T ′).
Consider the subgraph of G∗ whose edges are given by T ⊕ N . Its connected components are alternating
paths / cycles. We are left to show that, for each such connected component ρ, we have φ(N ∩ ρ, T ′ ∩ ρ) ≤
2 · φ(T ′ ∩ ρ,N ∩ ρ). This concludes the proof, since summing both sides over all connected components ρ of
T ⊕N , we get φ(N,T ′) ≤ 2 · φ(T ′, N), as (T \ T ′) ∩N = ∅.
First, let ρ be an alternating cycle. We know from the popularity of T in G∗ that, if we restrict to vertices
of ρ, we have φG∗(T,N) ≥ φG∗(N,T ). Every vertex in ρ is matched in N , hence ρ cannot contain any element
of W . Thus T ′ = T when restricted to ρ and so φ(T ′, N) ≥ φ(N,T ′) when restricted to the vertices of ρ.
Now suppose ρ is an alternating path, and denote this path by p. As in the case of alternating cycles,
we have φG∗(T,N) ≥ φG∗(N,T ) restricted to vertices of p. If p does not contain any element of W , then T
and T ′ are identical on vertices of p and so φ(T ′, N) ≥ φ(N,T ′) in G. Note moreover that vertices from W
cannot have degree 2 in p. So suppose one or both the endpoints of p belong to W .
Case 1. Both endpoints of p are in W . Since, by definition, vertices of W are not matched by N , exactly
one endpoint of p is in A. If p consists of a single edge (a, b), then a, b ∈W and these vertices are indifferent
between N and T ′ since both these matchings leave them unmatched.
So let p = 〈a1, b1, . . . , at, bt〉, where (ai, bi) ∈ T for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, where t ≥ 2, and a1, bt ∈ W (see Fig. 6,
left). Among the 2t vertices of p, we have: φG∗(T,N) = t2 ≥ t ≥ t1 = φG∗(N,T ).
The edges (a1, b1) and (at, bt) are new edges and so neither of these edges is in T ′. In the election between
T ′ and N when restricted to the vertices of p, we have φ(T ′, N) = t2 − 2 ≥ t− 2 (since T ′ loses out on the
votes of a1 and bt) and φ(N,T ′) = t1 ≤ t (since N preserves all its t1 votes). Thus when restricted to the 2t
vertices of p, we have φ(N,T ′)/φ(T ′, N) ≤ t/(t− 2). Note that a1 and bt are indifferent between T ′ and N
and hence abstain from voting.
If t ≥ 4 then we have the desired bound, i.e., φ(N,T ′)/φ(T ′, N) ≤ t/(t − 2) ≤ 2. We need to argue out
the cases of t = 2 and t = 3 separately.
– Suppose t = 2. Then p = 〈a1, b1, a2, b2〉 and both a1 and b2 are in W . So their partners in T , i.e., b1
and a2, are unstable vertices. However unstable vertices form an independent set in G, so (a2, b1) /∈ E,
contradicting that (a2, b1) ∈ N ⊆ E.
– Suppose t = 3. Then p = 〈a1, b1, a2, b2, a3, b3〉, where a1, b1, a3, b3 are unstable vertices (see Fig. 6, left).
We claim φ(N ∩ p, T ′ ∩ p) ≤ 2 ≤ φ(T ′ ∩ p,N ∩ p). The matching T is an extra-dominant matching (see
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Definition 3) and so it has a witness α in G∗ such that αa3 = −1. We use this to show that at most 2
vertices among the 4 vertices b1, a2, b2, a3 prefer N to T .
(i) Suppose (a2, b1) is a blocking edge to T . Then αb1 = αa2 = 1 and this also implies that αb2 = −1,
because αa2 + αb2 = wtT (a2, b2) = 0. So wtT (a3, b2) ≤ αa3 + αb2 = −2, i.e., (a3, b2) is a (−,−) edge
wrt T . However the edge (a3, b3) is a new edge that was introduced in G∗, so b3 is a3’s last choice
neighbor in G∗. Thus (a3, b2) cannot be a (−,−) edge wrt T and so (a2, b1) cannot be a blocking
edge to T . That is, this case never happens.
(ii) Hence (a2, b1) is not a blocking edge to T and so at least one of a2, b1 prefers T to N . We also know
that wtT (a3, b2) ≤ αa3+αb2 ≤ 0 since αa3 = −1. Thus at least one of a3, b2 prefers T to N . So at least
2 vertices among the 4 vertices b1, a2, b2, a3 prefer T to N . So φ(N ∩p, T ′∩p) ≤ 2 ≤ φ(T ′∩p,N ∩p).
Case 2. Exactly one endpoint of p is in W and p has an even number of vertices. So p = 〈a1, b1, . . . , at, bt〉,
where (ai, bi) ∈ T and exactly one of a1, bt is in W , say bt ∈W . Among the 2t vertices of p in G∗, we have:
φG∗(T,N) = t2 ≥ t ≥ t1 = φG∗(N,T ).
The edge (at, bt) is a new edge and so (at, bt) /∈ T ′. In the election between T ′ and N when restricted
to these 2t vertices, we have φ(N,T ′) = t1 ≤ t (since N preserves all its t1 votes from p) and φ(T ′, N) =
t2 − 1 ≥ t− 1 votes (since T ′ gets all the votes in favor of T other than bt’s vote). Thus when restricted to
these 2t vertices, we have φ(N,T ′)/φ(T ′, N) ≤ t/(t− 1) ≤ 2 since t ≥ 2.
Case 3. Exactly one endpoint of p is in W and p has an odd number of vertices, say 2t + 1, i.e., let
p = 〈a0, b1, a1, . . . , at〉, where (ai, bi) ∈ T and at ∈ W (see Fig. 6, right). Among the 2t + 1 vertices in p,
we have: φG∗(T,N) = t2 ≥ t + 1 while φG∗(N,T ) = t1 ≤ t. Again, the edge (at, bt) is a new edge and so
(at, bt) /∈ T ′.
In the election between T ′ and N when restricted to these 2t+ 1 vertices, we have φ(T ′, N) = t2 − 1 ≥ t
(since T ′ gets all the votes in favor of T other than at’s vote) while φ(N,T ′) = t1 ≤ t. Thus when restricted
to these 2t+ 1 vertices, φ(N,T ′) ≤ t ≤ φ(T ′, N). uunionsq
4.4 Proofs of Theorem 10 and Theorem 11
We know from Theorem 3 (proved in Section 3.2) that the popular matching polytope has no compact
extended formulation. Interestingly, this polytope has a compact extended formulation in a special case [27].
This is when G admits a perfect stable matching, i.e., when G has no unstable vertex. This follows from
work on popular fractional matchings [31,30] where a compact extended formulation of the popular fractional
matching polytope was given.
Let H be the marriage instance obtained by deleting the vertices of U∗ and their incident edges from
G∗ = (A ∪ B,E∗). So the vertex set of H is (A ∪ B) \ U∗ and its edge set EH = E∗ \ ∪u∈U∗δ∗(u) (note
that, for u ∈ U∗, δ∗(u) = δ(u)). Preferences in H are induced by preferences in G∗, i.e., vertices in U∗ are
deleted from the preference lists of their neighbors. Since U∗ is the set of unstable vertices in G∗, every stable
matching in H is perfect. So every popular matching in H is perfect and hence, dominant (by Theorem 6).
The polytope EH defined by inequalities (10)–(14) below is an extension of the popular fractional matching
polytope of H, as shown in [31,30]: (where cx(a, b) is as in (1))
αa + αb ≥ cx(a, b) ∀(a, b) ∈ EH (10)
αu ≥ −1 ∀u ∈ (A ∪B) \ U∗ (11)∑
u∈(A∪B)\U∗
αu = 0 (12)
∑
e∈δH(u)
xe = 1 ∀u ∈ (A ∪B) \ U∗ (13)
xe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ EH (14)
The following theorem will be useful. For any matching M , let IM be its characteristic vector.
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Theorem 12 ([27]). In any marriage instance H that admits a perfect stable matching, each extreme point
(x,α) of EH is such that x = IM , where M is a popular matching in H, α ∈ {±1}n0 is a witness of M , and
n0 is the number of vertices in H.
We will call a witness α such that αv ∈ {±1} for all popular vertices v a dominant witness. Every
dominant matching has such a witness (by Theorem 7). Note that the witness α promised by Theorem 12
is a dominant witness.
It is easy to see (from Theorem 12) that for any vertex u in H, the constraint αu ≤ 1 is a valid inequality
for EH . Therefore EH ∩ {αv = 1 : ∀v ∈ Nbr(U∗)} is a face of EH , where Nbr(U∗) ⊆ B is the set of neighbors
in G∗ (equivalently, in G) of vertices in U∗. Call this face ZH . Theorem 12 and the definition of ZH imply
the following: (let n0 = |(A ∪B) \ U∗|)
– every extreme point of ZH is (IN ,γ) where IN is the incidence vector of a popular matching N in H
and γ ∈ {±1}n0 is a (dominant) witness of N such that γv = 1 for all v ∈ Nbr(U∗).
Proof of Theorem 11. Let (x,α) ∈ CG∗ . It follows from constraints (5)-(6) that xe = 0 for all edges e
incident to vertices in U∗ and αa = 0 for all a ∈ U∗. Let (x′,α′) be obtained from (x,α) by projecting out
coordinates xe for e ∈ δ∗(a), a ∈ U∗ and αa for a ∈ U∗.
It is straightforward to see that (x′,α′) satisfies constraints (10)-(14) that define EH . Moreover, we have
αb ≥ 1 for all b ∈ Nbr(U∗) due to constraint (2) for the edge (a, b) where a ∈ U∗. This is because cx(a, b) = 1
for such an edge (a, b) and αa = 0. Thus (x′,α′) ∈ ZH .
Since ZH is integral, (x′,α′) is a convex combination of (IN1 ,γ1), . . . , (INk ,γk) where N1, . . . , Nk are
popular matchings inH with respective dominant witnesses γ1, . . . ,γk and we have γiv = 1 for all v ∈ Nbr(U∗)
and 1 ≤ i ≤ k. For each i, matching Ni can be viewed as a matching N˜i in G∗, so IN˜i has value 0 in
coordinates corresponding to edges in δ∗(u) for u ∈ U∗. Similarly, we extend the witness vector γi ∈ {±1}n0
to a vector γ˜i ∈ {0,±1}n by assigning γ˜iu = 0 for all u ∈ U∗. Thus (x,α) is a convex combination of
(IN˜1 , γ˜
1), . . . , (IN˜k , γ˜
k). Hence CG∗ is integral.
Note that γ˜i is a dominant witness of N˜i, thus N˜i is a dominant matching in G∗ (by Theorem 7). Hence,
all extreme points of CG∗ are of the form (IN ,γ), where N is a dominant matching in G∗ and γ is a dominant
witness. The following claim completes the proof of Theorem 11.
Claim 4 For any dominant matching M in G∗ and any dominant witness β of M , (IM ,β) ∈ CG∗ .
Proof. We need to show that (IM ,β) satisfies constraints (2)-(8). It follows from the definition of witness
that
∑
u∈A∪B βu = 0. We also know that βu ∈ {±1} for u ∈ (A∪B)\U∗ (by definition of dominant witness)
and βu = 0 for u ∈ U∗ (see the proof of Lemma 4). Since M is a dominant matching, all popular vertices,
i.e., those in (A ∪ B) \ U∗, are matched in M ; also M ⊆ E∗D (the set of dominant edges in G∗). Hence all
constraints in (3)-(8) are satisfied by (IM ,β).
Regarding the constraints in (2), it follows from the definition of witness that βa + βb ≥ wtM (a, b) for
all (a, b) ∈ E∗. We have cM (a, b) = wtM (a, b) for all edges (a, b) except when a ∈ U∗. For such an edge
(a, b) ∈ U∗ × Nbr(U∗), we have wtM (a, b) = 0 but cM (a, b) = 1. Since βa = 0 and βb ∈ {±1}, we deduce
βb = 1 and βa + βb = 1 = cM (a, b). Thus (IM ,β) satisfies all the constraints defining CG∗ . uunionsq
Proof of Theorem 10. The constraints αa ≥ −1 for all a ∈ UA \ U∗ are valid inequalities for CG∗ , thus
CG∗ ∩{αa = −1 : a ∈ UA \U∗} defines a face of CG∗ . This face is the polytope FG∗ . Since CG∗ is integral, so is
FG∗ . Every extreme point of FG∗ has the form (IN ,γ) where N is a dominant matching and γ is a dominant
witness of N along with the extra condition that γa = −1 for a ∈ UA \ U∗. Thus N is an extra-dominant
matching (see Definition 3) and γ is an extra-dominant witness of N .
Since (IM ,β) ∈ CG∗ for every dominant matching M and every dominant witness β of M , we have
(IN ,γ) ∈ FG∗ for every extra-dominant matching N and every extra-dominant witness γ of N . Thus FG∗
is an extension of the extra-dominant matching polytope of G∗. uunionsq
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5 The Dominant Matching Polytope
We prove Theorem 4 in this section. Section 5.1 shows a compact extended formulation for the dominant
matching polytope. In Section 5.2, we formulate this polytope in the original space Rm and Section 5.3 shows
a lower bound on the number of facets of this polytope.
5.1 A new extended formulation for the dominant matching polytope
We now show how to modify Theorem 11 so as to obtain an extended formulation for DG that holds for any
marriage instance G = (A ∪ B,E). Let U be the set of unpopular vertices of G and let ED be the set of
dominant edges of G. Consider the following variant E ′G of the extended formulation EG for the fractional
popular matching polytope of G [30,31]:
αa + αb ≥ cx(a, b) ∀(a, b) ∈ E (15)
αu ≥ −
∑
e∈δG(u)
xe ∀u ∈ A ∪B (16)
∑
u∈A∪B
αu = 0 (17)∑
e∈δG˜(u)
xe = 1 ∀u ∈ A ∪B (18)
xe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ EG˜, (19)
where again cx(a, b) is defined as in (1) for a, b /∈ U and cx(a, b) = 1 for a ∈ U or b ∈ U , while G˜ is the graph
G augmented with self-loops, see Section 2.
The only difference between E ′G and EG is in the right side of constraint (15): for EG, this would be the
sum in (1) for all edges (a, b) ∈ E. So for a ∈ U or b ∈ U , we would have αa + αb ≥ 0 in the formulation EG
while we have αa + αb ≥ 1 here.
Adding to (15)–(19) the following constraints: (let ED˜ = ED ∪ {(u, u) : u ∈ U})
xe = 0 ∀e ∈ EG˜ \ ED˜ (20)
gives a face, call it RG, of E ′G.
Claim 5 For any dominant matching M in G and any dominant witness β of M , (IM ,β) ∈ RG.
Note that M ⊆ ED˜, so constraint (20) holds. The proof of Claim 5 is completely analogous to that of
Claim 4, with the addendum that (16) is tight for all unstable vertices u (see the proof of Lemma 4), thus
βu = 0 for u ∈ U and this implies βv = 1 for v ∈ Nbr(U) (since βv ∈ {±1}).
Now let (x,α) ∈ RG. We want to show it is a convex combination of vectors (IM ,βM ), where M is a
popular matching and βM is a witness of M , and that βv ∈ {±1} for all v ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U . The proof is
completely analogous to the proof of Theorem 12 ([27]), hence omitted. We conclude the following.
Theorem 13. The polytope RG defined by constraints (15)–(20) is an extended formulation of the dominant
matching polytope of G.
5.2 The dominant matching polytope in Rm
In this section we describe the convex hull of characteristic vectors of dominant matchings in G = (A∪B,E).
Recall that all dominant matchings in G match the same subset of vertices (see Section 2). Let U ⊆ A ∪ B
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be the set of unpopular vertices in G: so every vertex in U is left unmatched in any dominant matching in G.
Note that U has to be an independent set in G. Let ED ⊆ E be the set of dominant edges in G, i.e., e ∈ ED
if there is a dominant matching in G with the edge e.
Suppose x ∈ Rm is a convex combination of dominant matchings. Then we have:
∑
e∈δ(u)
xe = 1 ∀u ∈ (A ∪B) \ U,
xe = 0 ∀e ∈ E \ ED, (21)
xe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ ED.
For any matching M in G, let kM ≥ 0 be the number of vertices in U that are matched in M . Consider
the following family of constraints:
∆(M,x) ≤ −kM ∀ matching M in G, (22)
where we define ∆(M,x) to be the sum of (fractional) votes for M versus x in an election between M and
x. More precisely, in this election a vertex u ∈ U puts in a vote of 1 for M versus x if it is matched in M ,
else its vote for M versus x is 0; every vertex u ∈ (A∪B) \U puts in a vote∑v′:v′≺uv xuv′ −∑v′:v′uv xuv′
for M versus x, where v is u’s partner in M .
For a fixed M , ∆(M,x) is a linear function of x, hence the set XG ⊂ Rm of points that satisfy (21) and
(22) is a polytope. We now prove that XG is the convex hull of dominant matchings in G.
The starting point is the fact that there is an efficient separation oracle for the constraints that define
XG. Given a point x that satisfies the constraints in (21), we can efficiently determine if x satisfies all the
constraints in (22) by solving the max-weight perfect matching problem in the graph G˜ (this is G augmented
with self-loops) with the edge weight function cx. This function cx is exactly as defined in (1) for edges (a, b)
where neither a nor b is in U and cx(a, b) = 1 if a or b is in U . We extend the function cx to self-loops as
cx(u, u) = 0 for u ∈ U and cx(u, u) = −1 for u /∈ U . Note that cx is an affine function of x.
Claim 6 Let x satisfy all constraints in (21). Then x ∈ XG if and only if cx(M) ≤ 0 for every perfect
matching M in G˜.
If we had assigned cx(a, b) = 0 for edges (a, b) where a or b is in U , then for e ∈ E, cx(e) would have been
the sum of votes of the endpoints of e for each other versus their respective assignments in x. Then it would
have been cx(M) = ∆(M,x) for any perfect matching M in G˜. With the above assignment of weights, i.e.,
with cx(a, b) = 1 for edges (a, b) where a or b is in U , we now have cx(M) = ∆(M,x) + kM for any perfect
matching M in G˜. Thus Claim 6 follows.
Consider the max-weight perfect matching LP in G˜ = (A ∪ B, E˜) with respect to cx: this is LP5 given
below in variables ye for e ∈ E˜. The linear program LP6 in variables αu for u ∈ A ∪B is the dual of LP5.
maximize
∑
e∈E˜
cx(e) · ye (LP5)
subject to ∑
e∈δ(u)∪{(u,u)}
ye = 1 ∀u ∈ A ∪B
ye ≥ 0 ∀ e ∈ E˜.
minimize
∑
u∈A∪B
αu (LP6)
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subject to
αa + αb ≥ cx(a, b) ∀ (a, b) ∈ E
αu ≥ cx(u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B.
So x ∈ Rm that satisfies the constraints in (21) also satisfies the constraints in (22) if and only if the
optimal solution of LP5 is 0, equivalently, if and only if the optimal solution of LP6 is 0; thus x ∈ XG if and
only if there exists a dual feasible α ∈ Rn such that ∑u∈A∪B αu = 0. Hence XG has the following compact
extended formulation:
αa + αb ≥ cx(a, b) ∀(a, b) ∈ E (23)
αu ≥ cx(u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B (24)∑
u∈A∪B
αu = 0 (25)∑
e∈δ(u)
xe = 1 ∀u ∈ (A ∪B) \ U (26)
xe = 0 ∀e ∈ E \ ED (27)
xe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ ED (28)
Let YG be the polytope described by constraints (23)-(28). We will show that YG is an extension of the
dominant matching polytope DG. Thus XG is the same as DG.
We proved in Section 5.1 that constraints (15)-(20) define an extension RG of DG (see Theorem 13).
Claim 7 implies that YG is an extension of DG. This settles the upper bound given in Theorem 4.
Claim 7 YG is a projection of RG.
Proof. Consider any point (x,α) ∈ RG. Constraints (18) and (20) imply that
∑
e∈δ(u) xe = 1 for all u ∈
(A ∪ B) \ U and x(u,u) = 1 for all u ∈ U . Thus the right side of constraint (16) is exactly the same
as cx(u, u) for all vertices u. Thus constraints (23)-(26) hold. Also, constraints (27) and (28) are implied
by constraints (19) and (20). Thus if R′G is the projection of RG obtained by projecting out coordinates
corresponding to self-loops, then R′G ⊆ YG.
Conversely, consider any point (x,α) ∈ YG. Constraints (24) and (26) imply that αu ≥ cx(u, u) = −1 =
−∑e∈δG(u) xe for u ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U . We also have αu ≥ cx(u, u) = 0 = −∑e∈δG(u) xe for u ∈ U (the second
equality is because every edge e incident to u ∈ U is in E \ ED and constraint (27) tells us that xe = 0).
Thus constraints (15)-(17) hold.
Let us augment x with coordinates x(u,u) for all vertices u defined as x(u,u) = 1 for all u ∈ U and
x(u,u) = 0 for all u ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U . Since
∑
e∈δG(u) xe = 1 for u ∈ (A ∪ B) \ U and
∑
e∈δG(u) xe = 0 for
u ∈ U , constraint (18) is satisfied. Constraint (19) clearly holds. Moreover, constraint (27) along with the
above values of x(u,u) for all u implies constraint (20). Thus the augmented (x,α) ∈ RG, in other words,
the original (x,α) ∈ R′G (the projection of RG defined above). That is, YG ⊆ R′G. Hence YG = R′G. uunionsq
5.3 A lower bound on the number of facets of the dominant matching polytope
We will now prove the second part of Theorem 4, i.e., the dominant matching polytope DG has Ω(cm) facets,
for some constant c > 1. For any even k, consider the 2SAT formula ψ defined as:
(X1 ∨X2) ∧ (X3 ∨X4) ∧ · · · ∧ (Xk−1 ∨Xk)
∧
(¬X1 ∨ ¬X2) ∧ · · · ∧ (¬Xk−1 ∨ ¬Xk).
25
Observe that ψ has 2k/2 feasible or satisfying assignments, and in particular, for each satisfying assign-
ment, there is exactly one literal in each clause that makes the clause true. We can associate to ψ a marriage
instance G from [10] where it was used to show the hardness of finding a popular matching that is not
dominant. We give here an overview of this construction, and refer to [10, Section 4] for details such as
preference lists.
The instance. G is the series composition of a starting edge (s, u0), a gadget for each clause i, and a final
edge (vk, t). The gadget for clause i starts with vertex vi−1 and ends with vertex ui and contains the parallel
composition of disjoint literal gadgets Zi,j for each literal j in clause i. See Fig. 7. Note that there is only
one edge from v0 to Z1,1, only one edge from v0 to Z1,2, etc. Each gadget corresponding to a positive literal
is connected through a consistency edge to the gadget of the corresponding negative literal.
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Fig. 7. The high-level picture of the instance G from Section 5.3.
Denote by S the family of stable, non-dominant matchings in G. Recall that GS is G with edges labeled
(−,−) wrt S deleted. We will show at the end of this section that the following two properties are true in G:
1. for each S ∈ S, GS has exactly one S-augmenting path ρS ;
2. for each matching M of G, M ⊇ (ρS \ S) for at most one S ∈ S.
For S ∈ S, letMS be the set of matchings M such that M ⊇ (ρS \ S). We will show the following claim
for every S ∈ S and N /∈MS . For any two matchings N and S, we let ∆(N,S) = ∆(N, IS), where IS is the
characteristic vector of matching S.
Claim 8 S satisfies ∆(N,S) ≤ −kN for all matchings N /∈MS.
Proof. Let N /∈ MS and let e ∈ (ρS \ S) \N . Let Ge be the instance obtained from G by removing edge e.
Note that S,N are matchings of Ge, and S is clearly popular, since it is stable (hence popular) in G. There
is no S-augmenting path in GeS , since ρS was the only S-augmenting path in GS (from (1)). Hence, from
Theorem 6 we conclude that S is dominant in Ge. That is, S ∈ DGe and the value kN is the same in both
G and Ge. Hence ∆(N,S) ≤ −kN . uunionsq
Since IS /∈ DG, there must be some inequality from (21) or (22) that is not satisfied by IS . One easily
checks that IS satisfies all inequalities from (21). Hence, because of Claim 8, IS must be cut off by an
inequality ∆(M,S) ≤ −kM for someM ∈MS . Thus, in any minimal system contained in (21)–(22), at least
one inequality ∆(M,S) ≤ −kM for some M ∈MS is present.
Since MS ∩ MS′ = ∅ for S′ 6= S in S (from (2)), any such minimal system contains at least |S| =
2k/2 = 2Θ(k) inequalities. The lower bound in Theorem 4 then follows from the fact that inequalities in a
minimal system are in one-to-one correspondence with the facets of the polyhedron they describe, see e.g. [7,
Theorem 3.30].
Properties (1)-(2). To deduce the properties used in our lower bound argument, we need some more facts
from [10].
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Preference lists are defined such that for the 2SAT instance ψ defined above, there is a bijection pi between
satisfying assignments to ψ and matchings in S.
Each S ∈ S, when restricted to a literal gadget, coincides with one of two possible sets of edges. We say
therefore that S induces either a true state or a false state in the gadget. For each variable Xi, the mapping
pi is such that the gadget of Xi is in true state if and only if the gadget of ¬Xi is in false state if and only if
Xi = true in the corresponding assignment. Moreover, the following holds.
Claim 9 ([10]) Let S ∈ S. Then:
(i) any S-augmenting path in GS goes from s to t, does not use any consistency edge, and passes in each
clause gadget through a literal gadget that is in true state.
(ii) (u`, v`) ∈ S for all ` = 0, . . . , k.
We can now show properties (1)-(2):
– Property (1) follows from Claim 9, part (i), and by the fact that for every clause in ψ, in every satisfying
assignment to the instance, there is exactly one literal set to true.
– Property (2) can be deduced as follows. Fix S ∈ S. By Claim 9, parts (i) and (ii), ρS \ S matches all
vertices vi for i = 0, . . . , k− 1 with a vertex in the gadget corresponding to the unique literal set to true
in the (i + 1)-th clause. Since any two feasible assignments differ in at least one variable, we have that
for S 6= S′ ∈ S, (ρS \ S) and (ρS′ \ S′) match some of the vi differently. The desired property follows.
6 Quasi-popular matching via the popular fractional matching polytope
The popular fractional matching polytope is a relaxation of the popular matching polytope that contains,
roughly speaking, all points of the matching polytope that satisfy a linearization of the popularity constraint.
More formally, the popular fractional matching polytope LG is the set of all points x in the matching polytope
of G that satisfy ∆(M,x) ≤ 0 for all matchings M in G. Recall that ∆(M,x) is the sum of (fractional) votes
for M versus x in an election between M and x, and it is linear in x (see Section 5.2).
The polytope LG need not be integral. Fig. 8 has an instance from [27] with a popular half-integral
matching that cannot be written as a convex combination of two popular matchings.
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Fig. 8. The 3 vertices a0, a1, a2 prefer b1 to b2. Both b1, b2 prefer a1 to a2 and a0 is their last choice. The blue
matching S = {(a1, b1), (a2, b2)} is the only popular matching here. The red matching is not popular, however
the half-integral matching x where xe = 1/2 for all e in {(a1, b1), (a1, b2), (a2, b1), (a2, b2)} is popular.
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Interestingly, the polytope LG is half-integral. We refer to [27] for details. The formulation of LG in Rm
involves exponentially many constraints:
∆(M,x) ≤ 0 ∀matchings M∑
e∈δ(u)∪{(u,u)}
xe = 1 ∀u ∈ A ∪B and xe ≥ 0 ∀ e ∈ E.
A compact extended formulation of LG was given in [31,30]. This formulation was discussed in Section 4.4
for the case when the graph admits a perfect stable matching (this was the case with H in Section 4.4). We
now describe the extension EG of LG. The function cx(a, b) is as defined in (1) for all (a, b) ∈ E. We have to
define cx(v, v) for v ∈ A ∪B as well: let cx(v, v) = 0 for v ∈ UA ∪ UB , else cx(v, v) = −1.
αa + αb ≥ cx(a, b) ∀(a, b) ∈ E (29)
αu ≥ cx(u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B (30)∑
u∈A∪B
αu = 0 (31)∑
e∈δ(u)∪{(u,u)}
xe = 1 ∀u ∈ A ∪B (32)
xe ≥ 0 ∀e ∈ E (33)
We can find a min-cost popular fractional matching q in G in polynomial time by optimizing over EG.
We can, in fact, assume that q is a vertex of LG, hence half-integral. We will now show how we can use q to
obtain a quasi-popular matching of cost at most cost(q).
We will show that q can be expressed as (IN0 + IN1)/2 where N0 and N1 are quasi-popular matchings in
G (recall that IN is the edge incidence vector of matching N). Since cost(N0) + cost(N1) = 2 · cost(q), one
of N0, N1 has cost at most cost(q). Thus the matching in {N0, N1} with lower cost is our desired matching.
Definition 2. If (p,β) satisfies constraints (29)-(33) then β will be called a witness of p’s popularity.
That is, for any p in the matching polytope of G (this is by constraints (32)-(33)), β is a witness of p’s
popularity if constraints (29)-(31) are satisfied. When p is integral, note that these 3 constraints are the
same as the 3 constraints in Theorem 5 that characterized popular matchings in terms of witnesses.
6.1 A new graph with a perfect popular matching
The following useful property on q follows from the proof of half-integrality of LG given in [27]: for every
u ∈ A ∪ B we have ∑e∈δ(u) qe ∈ {0, 1}. In other words, every vertex u is either “completely matched” or
“completely unmatched” in q (so q(u,u) = 1), i.e., no vertex is half-matched in q.
Let UA be the set of vertices in A that are left unmatched in q and let UB be the set of vertices in B
that are left unmatched in q. We now augment the graph G with new vertices and new edges as follows.
Corresponding to each u ∈ UA ∪UB , there will be a new vertex u′. Thus the vertex set of the augmented
graph (call it G′) is A′ ∪ B′ where A′ = A ∪ U ′B and B′ = B ∪ U ′A. Here U ′A = {u′ : u ∈ UA}, i.e., U ′A is
another copy of UA, and U ′B = {u′ : u ∈ UB} is another copy of UB . Note that U ′A ⊆ B′ and U ′B ⊆ A′.
The edge set E′ of G′ is E ∪ {(u, u′) : u ∈ UA ∪ UB}. The vertex u′ is the least preferred neighbor of u
for every u ∈ UA ∪ UB and u is u′’s lone neighbor. Fig. 9 will be helpful.
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Fig. 9. Vertices in gray boxes, i.e., in U ′A ∪ U ′B , are the new vertices in G′ and the new edges are (u, u′) for
u ∈ UA ∪ UB .
The fractional matching q′. We extend q to a half-integral matching q′ in G′ as follows.
– for each e ∈ E: assign q′e = qe;
– for every u ∈ UA ∪ UB : assign q′(u,u′) = 1.
Thus q′ = q ∪ {(u, u′) : u ∈ UA ∪ UB}. Observe that the fractional matching q′ is perfect in G′. This is
because all vertices in A∪B that are outside UA ∪UB were already (completely) matched in q. The vertices
left unmatched in q are precisely those in UA ∪ UB – these were left completely unmatched in q – each
u ∈ UA ∪ UB is now matched to its twin u′ ∈ U ′A ∪ U ′B in q′.
The following lemma will be useful to us.
Lemma 7. The half-integral matching q′ is popular in G′.
Proof. It follows from the special half-integrality of q in G that cq(e) ∈ Z for all e ∈ E; also cq(u, u) ∈ {0,−1}
for all vertices u ∈ A∪B. Consider the LP with min∑u∈A∪B αu as the objective and with (29)–(30) as the
constraints. The total unimodularity of this system implies that q has an integral witness α; more precisely,
α ∈ {0,±1}n. Also αu = 0 for every u ∈ UA ∪ UB (by complementary slackness on (30)). We refer to [27]
for details.
In order to prove the popularity of q′, we will now define a witness α′ for q′ as follows: let α′u = αu for
all u ∈ A ∪ B and α′u = 0 for u ∈ U ′A ∪ U ′B . We need to show q′ and α′ satisfy constraints (29)-(33). We
already know that q′ satisfies (32)-(33). We will show now that (29)-(31) are satisfied.
1. α′a+α′b ≥ cq′(a, b) for all (a, b) ∈ E′: this follows from the fact that α′a+α′b = αa+αb ≥ cq(a, b) = cq′(a, b)
for all (a, b) ∈ E. The new edges in G′ are (u, u′) for u ∈ UA ∪UB and we have α′u+α′u′ = 0 = cq′(u, u′).
2. α′v ≥ −1 = cq′(v, v) for all v ∈ A′ ∪B′.
3.
∑
u∈A′∪B′ α
′
u = 0: this follows from the definition of α′ and the fact that
∑
u∈A∪B αu = 0.
Thus q′ is popular in G′ with witness α′. uunionsq
It was shown in [27] that any popular fractional matching that is perfect can be written as a convex
combination of popular matchings. We now claim Lemma 8 follows from the proof in [27].
Lemma 8. A popular half-integral matching q′ in G′ that is perfect can be written as q′ = (IM0 + IM1)/2
for popular matchings M0 and M1 in G′.
Proof. Consider any a ∈ A′. Since q′ is half-integral, the vertex a has at most 2 partners in q′. Call these 2
partners b and b′: it could be the case that b = b′. If b = b′ then we have q′(a,b) = 1; else q
′
(a,b) = q
′
(a,b′) = 1/2
and assume without loss of generality that a likes b more than b′. We will form an array X ′a with 2 cells
(each of length 1/2) as follows. In case a has a single partner b in q′ then both cells of X ′a have b in them.
Else:
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– if α′a ∈ {±1} then the first cell of X ′a has b′ and the second cell of X ′a has b, i.e., a’s partners in q′ are
arranged in increasing order of a’s preference order.
– if α′a = 0 then the first cell of X ′a has b and the second cell of X ′a has b′, i.e., a’s partners in q′ are
arranged in decreasing order of a’s preference order.
Consider any b ∈ B′. Since q′ is half-integral, the vertex b has at most 2 partners in q′. Call these 2
partners a and a′: it could be the case that a = a′. If a = a′ then we have q′(a,b) = 1; else q
′
(a,b) = q
′
(a′,b) = 1/2
and assume b likes a more than a′. We will form an array X ′b with 2 cells (each of length 1/2) as follows. In
case b has a single partner a in q′ then both cells of X ′b have a in them. Else:
– if α′b ∈ {±1} then the first cell of X ′b has a and the second cell of X ′b has a′, i.e., b’s partners in q′ are
arranged in decreasing order of b’s preference order.
– if α′b = 0 then the first cell of X
′
b has a
′ and the second cell of X ′b has a, i.e., b’s partners in q
′ are
arranged in increasing order of b’s preference order.
Define the matchings M0 and M1 as follows:
M0 = {(u, v) : u ∈ A′ ∪B′ and v is in the first cell of X ′u}
M1 = {(u, v) : u ∈ A′ ∪B′ and v is in the second cell of X ′u}.
It was shown [27] that both M0 and M1 are matchings in G′ and moreover, they are popular. Thus q′ =
(IM0 + IM1)/2 for popular matchings M0 and M1 in G′. uunionsq
Remark. Note that both M0 and M1 contain edges (u, u′) for all u ∈ UA ∪ UB . This is because q′(u,u′) = 1
for all u ∈ UA ∪ UB .
The popularity of M0 and M1 was proved in [27] by showing witnesses of popularity β and γ for M0
and M1, respectively. Moreover, βu, γu ∈ {±1} for every u ∈ A′ ∪ B′. In fact, (q′,α′) will be a convex
combination of (IM0 ,β) and (IM1 ,γ). More precisely, we have:
(q′,α′) =
1
2
· (IM0 ,β) +
1
2
· (IM1 ,γ).
Thus for any u ∈ A′ ∪B′: α′u = (βu+ γu)/2, so when α′u ∈ {±1}, we have βu = γu = α′u. The non-trivial
case is when α′u = 0. For any u ∈ A′ ∪B′ with α′u = 0:
1. if u ∈ A′ then (i) βu = −1 and γu = 1;
2. if u ∈ B′ then (i) βu = 1 and γu = −1.
Corollary 1 follows from the fact that α′a = α′b = 0 for a ∈ UA ⊆ A′ and b ∈ UB ⊆ B′.
Corollary 1. For a ∈ UA, we have βa = −1 and γa = 1. For b ∈ UB, we have βb = 1 and γb = −1.
Let N0 (resp., N1) be the matching obtained by deleting edges (u, u′) for u ∈ UA ∪ UB from M0 (resp.,
M1). Thus N0 and N1 are matchings in G. Note that q = (IN0 + IN1)/2.
Lemma 9. The matchings N0 and N1 are quasi-popular in G.
Proof. It will be useful to partition A \UA into A−1 ∪A1 and B \UB into B1 ∪B−1 as follows. For k = ±1:
– let Ak be the set of those a ∈ A \ UA such that βa = k.
– let Bk be the set of those b ∈ B \ UB such that βb = k.
We have N0 ⊆ (A1 × B−1) ∪ (A−1 × B1). Fig. 10 will be useful. We now define a certificate β′ of N0’s
quasi-popularity.
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Fig. 10. N0 ⊆ (A1 × B−1) ∪ (A−1 × B1). Let β′a = 2 for a ∈ A1, β′b = −2 for b ∈ B−1, and β′u = 0 for
u ∈ A−1 ∪B1 ∪ UA ∪ UB .
– Let β′a = 2 for all a ∈ A1 and let β′b = −2 for all b ∈ B−1. Let β′u = 0 for all other vertices u.
We need to show that β′ obeys the three constraints given below, see (LP1)–(LP2).
β′a + β
′
b ≥ gN0(a, b) ∀(a, b) ∈ E (34)
β′u ≥ gN0(u, u) ∀u ∈ A ∪B (35)∑
u∈A∪B
β′u = 0. (36)
Recall that the function gN0(e) for any e ∈ E is defined as follows:
gN0(e) =

+2 if e is labeled (+,+)
−4 if e is labeled (−,−)
−1 if e is labeled (+,−) or (−,+)
0 if e ∈ N0.
For any u ∈ A ∪B: gN0(u, u) = 0 if u is unmatched in N0 and gN0(u, u) = −2 if u is matched in N0.
Constraint (34). For any edge (a, b), we have β′a + β′b = βa + βb: this is because β
′
a = βa + 1 for a ∈ A and
β′b = βb − 1 for b ∈ B. We have β′a + β′b = βa + βb ≥ wtM0(a, b) ≥ gN0(a, b) for all edges (a, b) ∈ E,5 where
βa + βb ≥ wtM0(a, b) holds for each edge (a, b) ∈ E due to the popularity of M0 in G′ with witness β.
Constraint (35). Corollary 1 tells us that βa = −1 for a ∈ UA and βb = 1 for b ∈ UB , so β′u = 0 = gN0(u, u)
for an unmatched vertex u. We also have β′u ≥ −2 = gN0(u, u) for a matched vertex u. Thus β′u ≥ gN0(u, u)
for all vertices u.
Constraint (36). Observe that β′a+β′b = 0 for every edge (a, b) in N0 and β
′
u = 0 for every unmatched vertex
u. So
∑
u∈A∪B β
′
u = 0. Thus constraints (34)-(36) are satisfied; so N0 is quasi-popular in G.
The quasi-popularity of N1 in G can be shown similarly. For this, we partition A \UA into A′1 ∪A′−1 and
B \ UB into B′1 ∪B′−1 (based on γ). Fig. 11 will be useful here. We define a witness γ′ as follows:
– Let γ′b = 2 for all b ∈ B′1 and let γ′a = −2 for all a ∈ A′−1 and γ′u = 0 for all other vertices u.
As done for β′ and N0 above, we can show that γ′ is a certificate of N1’s quasi-popularity. uunionsq
5 Note that wtM0(a, b) = 0 implies gN0(a, b) ∈ {0,−1} and wtM0(a, b) = −2 implies gN0(a, b) = −4 and
wtM0(a, b) = 2 implies gN0(a, b) = 2.
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Fig. 11. N1 ⊆ (B′1 × A′−1) ∪ (B′−1 × A′1). Let γ′a = 2 for b ∈ B′1, γ′a = −2 for a ∈ A′−1, and γ′u = 0 for
u ∈ B′−1 ∪A′1 ∪ UB ∪ UA.
Thus we have shown that both N0 and N1 are quasi-popular matchings in G. Since q = (IN0 + IN1)/2,
one of N0, N1 has cost at most cost(q). Since q can be computed in polynomial time, we can conclude the
following theorem.
Theorem 14. Given a marriage instance G = (A∪B,E) with a function cost : E → R, there is a polynomial
time algorithm to compute a quasi-popular matching M such that cost(M) ≤ cost(q), where q is a min-cost
popular fractional matching in G.
7 Conclusions and Open Problems
Our algorithm shows that one can circumvent the strong hardness result for computing a min-cost popular
matching by relaxing the notion of popularity via the concept of unpopularity factor. An open question is
to show an efficient algorithm for computing matchings with a smaller unpopularity factor. Another open
problem is to obtain a trade-off with respect to the two parameters: cost and unpopularity factor.
A future line of research is whether bi-criteria algorithms yield positive results in other matching problems
under preferences. The landscape of matchings under preferences is rich with algorithmic results and there
are also several intractability results. We refer to the books/monographs [22,32,34,38] on this subject. It
would be interesting to explore efficient bi-criteria algorithms for many well-known NP-hard problems here:
such results may also be of practical relevance.
Acknowledgments. We thank two anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments that improved the
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